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I. INTRODUCTION AND MAIN ARGUMENTS

In the post-1989 world, the primacy of private property is taken for
granted.' The final fall of communism, it would seem, is an adequate
commentary of the supremacy of private property arrangements in facilitating economic development. Debates pitting plan (with its associated
appetite for communal or collective property) against market (with its
avowed belief in private property) are now considered superfluous As
*

Doctor of Juridical Studies (S.J.D.), Harvard Law School, (2002); LL.M, Harvard

Law School, (1999); LL.B, University of Nairobi, Kenya, (1996); Associate, Foley Hoag, LLP,
Boston. This Article is part of the thesis entitled: Searchingfor the Market Criterion:MarketOriented Reforms in Legal and Economic Development Discourse which was awarded the
John Gallup Laylin Prize for the Best Essay in International Law at the Harvard Law School
for the 2001-02 academic year. The awarding Committee was chaired by Prof. Anne-Marie
Slaughter, now Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs, Princeton University. I am
grateful to my academic advisors, Professors Duncan Kennedy, David Kennedy and Robert
Bates for their guidance and inspiration throughout the period I was a doctoral candidate, and
especially for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. I thank my wife Sylvia
Kang'ara, a true property law theory "guru" for the many discussions we have had on some of
the ideas in this Article. I would also like to thank the editors of Michigan Journalof International Law, especially C.J. Albertie, for their hard work and thoughtful comments. This
Article is based, in part, on research done in Kenya with funds from the Weatherhead Center
for International Affairs for which I am grateful.
Editorialnote:
Kenyan cases are challenging to locate outside of Kenya. Furthermore, the Bluebook has
no specific rule regarding Kenyan reporters. Thus, the editors have tried to include enough
information in the cites to allow our readers to find the cases. Typically, the cite will include
the name of the case, the court which issued the decision and the date. In some cases, we have
also included the name of the deciding judge. Finally, all Kenyan cases are on file with the
author.
1.
As Gregory Alexander and Duncan Kennedy remind us, "property rights" have long
been taken for granted in Western legal systems, not just since 1989. Duncan Kennedy argues
that the fact that economists and legal theorists who write about property rights as the basis for
all market exchange, merely create the perception that there is a consensus about the definition
of property rights, but, in fact, there is no such consensus. Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law
in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939
(1985). On the other hand, Gregory Alexander posits that the widely shared view that property
materially defines the legal and political sphere in which individuals are free to pursue their
own private agendas and satisfy their own preferences free from governmental coercion, is a
popular misconception. He argues that there is no such consensus in American legal history
about the meaning of property and that the "preference-satisfying" conception of property is
rivaled by a conception of property that views property as the private basis for the public
good. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY 1-2 (1997).
The World Bank made this clear with World Development Report 1996, From Plan
2.
to Market which sought to chronicle post-1989 transitions from planned to market economies.
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT

1996,

FROM PLAN TO MARKET

(1996).
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far as the "Western world" was concerned, it seemed that the task of persuading the rest of the world that private property is the key to efficient
market performance and economic development had finally been accomplished.3 The only task left was for development and policy makers
to devise regimes for establishing private property arrangements in the
rest of the world. The argument made was that, barring transaction costs,
if: 1) the initial endowment of property rights is clearly defined; 2) corruption held in check; 3) freedom of contract entrenched; and 4) the rule
of law respected, then a viable market for property, and other rights to
economic resources will ensue.4 The eventual result would be an exchange and reallocation of property rights to the most efficient users
with attendant benefit to the entire economy.5 In the first instance, this
Article evaluates how this task of establishing regimes of "clear property
rights ' 6 supported by a transparent rule of law has worked out in prac-

tice.7

3.
Hernando de Soto argues that the clear and formal system of private property is the
mysterious explanation for why capitalism and economic development thrives in the West but
not elsewhere. A formal private property system, de Soto argues, is the primary element that
turns assets from "dead capital to "live capital." HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE

5-6, 159-62

(2002). Richard Pipes, similarly poses: "Juxtapose the history of England with that of Russia.
What emerges? The importance of private property." Richard Pipes, Private Properly, Freedom, and the Rule of Law, HOOVER DIG. 2001-02 (2001), available at http://wwwhoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/012/pipes.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
4.
Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
5.
See, e.g., Frank Byamugisha, The Effects of Land Registration on FinancialDevelopment and Economic Growth: A Theoretical and Conceptual Framework (World Bank Pol'y
Res. Working Paper No. 2240, 1999), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/
15367wps2240.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004); Klaus Deininger & Hans Binswanger, The
Evolution of the World Bank's Land Policy: Principles,Experience, and Future Challenges, 14
WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER

247 (1999).

6.
It is now accepted that legal articulation of property rights and contract rights are
essential precursors to the emergence of strong markets. See Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1737, 1743 (2002). Ellig suggests that a system of "clear
property rights" might, in fact, be used as a mechanism to internalize externalities-a departure from the earlier view that government regulation was required to deal with the problem of
externalities. See Jerry Ellig, The Economics of Regulatory Takings, 46 S.C. L. REV. 595, 596
(1995).
7.
Between 1988 and 2000, the World Bank, the foremost development institution in
the world, initiated 202 projects involving land administration and titling with a total cost of
over US $16 billion. See THE WORLD BANK GROUP, URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HOUSING AND
LAND, PROJECTS, at http://www.worldbank.org/urban/housing/projects.xls (last visited Apr. 8,
2004). The World Bank Group is one of the world's largest sources of development assistance.
It consists of five closely associated institutions: The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD), The International Development Association (IDA), The International Finance Corporation (IFC), The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),
and The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The term "World
Bank" refers specifically to the IBRD and IDA.
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In addition, I aim to convey four main themes that are often clouded
in discussions on private property and its role in capitalist economic development. First, I provide support, using analysis from the land
registration regime in Kenya, for Michael Heller's argument that the
creation and clear definition of property rights, is not sufficient to usher
in new markets in these property rights.8 Rather, how these rights are
created determines whether productive, efficient, and socially rational
exchange and utilization of property rights will actually take place. This
is notwithstanding the existence of a government that adheres to the rule
of law however defined. 9 Indeed, just as unclear property rights may
cause inefficient over-utilization of an economic resource, clear property
rights might be constituted in ways that gridlock efforts to rationalize
utilization of the resource, leading to inefficient under-utilization of that
resource.10
From a different perspective, common property, undefined or unclear
property rights lead to the well-known "tragedy of the commons.'" This
is a situation whereby multiple individuals are privileged to use a given
resource without a cost effective way of monitoring and constraining
each other's use, making the resource vulnerable to overuse. 12 Conversely, when multiple owners have the right to exclude others from
taking advantage of a scarce resource, and no one has an enforceable
privilege of use, the resource might be underutilized: a problem known
as the tragedy of the anticommons. In both cases, overall system productivity is undermined: one by a system that results in under-policing of
property rights,4 the other by a system that results in over-policing of
property rights.

8.
See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition From Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (observing that property
rights can create, as well as solve, collective action problems).
9.
The definition of "rule of law", as the definition of property, is fiercely contested.
See Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding, and Serving PalmWine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 167 (1997); Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival,
77 FOREIGN AFF. 95 (1998); Joel Ngugi, Searching for the Market Criterion: Market-Oriented
Reforms in Legal and Economic Development 128-95 (S.J.D. Dissertation, Harvard Law
School) (on file with the International Law Library, Harvard Law School).
10.
Heller, supra note 8.
11.
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 3 ScI. 1243 (1968).
12.
See id.
13.
Heller, supra note 8; see also James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric
Tragedies: Commons and Anti-Commons, 43 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (2000); Michael A. Heller, The
Boundariesof Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 (1999); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
Sci. 698 (1998).
14.
The argument here is that even assuming, arguendo, that it is possible to obtain a
politically neutral Pareto-optimal equilibrium by continual mutual exchange and trading in
property rights, the problem of over-policing property rights might make it impossible to reach
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Second, my analysis of attempts to create a clear property regime in
Kenya challenges the popular notion in the development discourse that
establishing a regime of clear property rights ushers in less government
as well as a private sphere where economic actors as private agents pursue their own agendas, subject only to the free market laws of supply and
demand.' 5 The analysis demonstrates that the binary between less and
more government is irrelevant. I use the lessons that the Kenyan land
registration exercise has bequeathed to us to demonstrate this. Land registration in Kenya, as in many other countries, was intended to be a
technico-legal reform aimed at clarifying property rights in land. However, whereas land registration is a technical exercise, it is also highly
manipulable and susceptible to ideological interpretation in order to accomplish hidden political motives. What emerges from this analysis is
that the meaning assigned to land registration is different from agnostic
mapping or technical mirroring of rights from the customary system to a
formal regime. Instead, the capturing of customary rights is often done
with the aim of reorganizing and transforming the rights of different
groups and individuals. Hence registration entails a choice of interpretation.
The ultimate effect of this choice in interpretation in Kenya was that
the technico-legal process of land registration had certain distributive
consequences. They were not acknowledged since the registration itself
was comprehended as an act of capturing the rights from one system to
another, not as an interpretive process. Despite claims to the contrary,
including attempts to cloak it as a technical exercise, the registration
such a desirable optimal position. A given allocation of resources is Pareto optimal if there is
no way to reallocate the resources available that would make at least one person better off
without making anyone else worse off. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 307-08 (1995). However, the problem presented by the realization that over-policing
compounds rather than ameliorates the coordination problem typical in human interaction is
further compounded by arguments that it is, in fact, impossible to obtain a politically neutral
Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Different scholars have demonstrated that Pareto optimality
analysis is both indeterminate and incomplete. It is now generally agreed that wealth and income effects, endowment effects, and adaptive preference formation may all condition
preferences on the distribution of legal entitlements, disproving the notion that automatic readjustments would lead to wealth-maximizing and efficiency-enhancing reallocation. See also
Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465, 469 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase
Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic
Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974); Laurence H.
Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 70 (1972).
15.
See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 10-11 (1985); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 129-41 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
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process necessarily involved giving rights to certain societal groups over
other groups competing for the same resources.
A different way to put this is to state that the government is a necessary component of the economic system, or that the polity and economy
are not preexistent, self-subsistent spheres but are in fact mutually defining.16 As such, a theoretical or analytical framework that comprehends
economic reform in terms of more or less government is fallacious.
When it comes to property rights, the relevant questions are who to protect, and how, not whether the government should regulate.
However, to argue that property rights are really about political
choices that the government makes is not to say that the government's
choice is translated into reality by a stroke of legislative pen. Quite the
contrary. In the case of land registration in Kenya, for example, the envisaged "transformation" (complete commodification of land and the
attendant economic consequences' 7) did not entirely follow through as a
result of strategic behavior of certain sectors in Kenyan society. These
sectors refused to accept all the implications of registration, such as
near-absolute powers of the individually registered owner. They organized, invented and mobilized customary norms to frustrate complete
operation of the new formal regime of tenure arrangements.' 8 At the
same time, they facilitated the operation of other aspects of this regime.
The analysis merely reinforces the earlier message that property rights
are neither natural nor clear. They are merely the products of existing
legal policies and social interactions with the institutions emerging from
these legal policies. 9
The third general argument is that it is often not possible to determine the consequences of a law or legal regime a priori.20 I show that
arguments that posit a determinate set of consequences as flowing from a
change in legal structure or legal institutions overestimate the determinacy of the economic consequences that flow from the legal institutions.
Or, as Warren Samuels would have it, the fundamentals of the legaleconomic nexus are not as simple and obvious as contemplated by views
that maintain that the polity and economy are pre-existent, selfsubsistent spheres.2' Such arguments are also often ideological.22 Further,
16.
Warren J. Samuels, The Legal-Economic Nexus, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1556,
1577-78 (1989).
17.
See Byamugisha, supra note 5.
18.
See infra Section IX.
19.
Robert W. Gordon, The Real Politics of Law, 2 JURIST (1999) (book review), at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revapr99.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
20.
See Samuels, supra note 16.
21.
Id. at 1557.
22.
I use the term "ideological" here to mean the more ordinary, value-neutral sense of
a system of political ideas. Stuart Hall defines ideology as, "the frameworks of thinking and
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my analysis demonstrates that when the posited economic consequences
follow from enactment of specific legal rules or institutions, it is often
calculation about the world-the 'ideas' which people use to figure out how the social world
works, what their place is in it, and what they ought to do." Stuart Hall, Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-StructuralistDebates, 2 CRIT. STUD. MASS COMM.
91, 99 (1985). This is close to Duncan Kennedy's definition of ideology as a method of generalizing claims. According to Kennedy, ideology is:
[A] universalization project of an ideological intelligentsia that sees itself as acting
"for" a group with interests in conflict with those of other groups ....

In this conception, the ideology is independent of the interests with which it is
"associated," though not so independent as to be altogether distinct. Dependence
and interdependence operate both on an ideal level and on a social level ....

An ideology is a "project, ... not just a translation of interests into another
medium. Rather, it is a mediation between interests and universal claims. People's
understanding of their interests comes about in the context of universalization into
ideology, as well as vice versa, so ideology can shape interests, as well as vice
versa. Ideology is not a superstructure responding to interests that are "materially
based" or otherwise just "given," nor is it "pure" domain of ideas ....

One is an ideologist because one has made a commitment to working within a complex body of texts, a discourse, and accepted the blinders and limitations that
inevitably go along with the advantages of such a commitment, and because the
commitment to the texts goes along with, and sometimes conflicts with, a commitment to a group or groups in conflict with others.
DUNCAN KENNEDY,

A

A

CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE

39-42 (1997) [hereinafter

CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION].

Thus, ideology is a system designed by an elite to convince everyone else that a particular set of social, political, and cultural arrangements serves everyone's best interests.
Conversely, ideology is a system designed by those who wish to overthrow the status quo and
convince others that a new set of specified arrangements will serve everyone's best interests.
The latter definition reflects the Althusserian definition of ideology denying that ideology is
simply the product of a conspiratorial power group. Althusser argues that ideology is omnipresent; it inheres in every representation of reality and every social practice, and all of these
qualities inevitably confirm or naturalize a particular construction of reality. See Louis Al-

thusser, Ideology And Ideological State Apparatuses, in

CRITICAL THEORY SINCE

1965 238

(Hazard Adams & Leroy Searle eds., 1986). The definition that best captures the value-free
sense I want to convey is Paul Leslie Theile's: "Ideology is the natural and largely unconscious outgrowth of lives lived in particular social positions within a competitive social
system." LESLIE PAUL THIELE, THINKING POLITICS: PERSPECTIVES IN ANCIENT, MODERN,
AND POSTMODERN POLITICAL THEORY 220-21 (1997).
This means that, based on a group's social position, that group makes judgments about
the relative place or worth of other individuals and groups. These judgments then construct
belief and value systems used to advocate for and/or establish particular power structures
corresponding with these views. At the same time, group members propound beliefs that justify both the judgments and the particular power structures established or proposed to be
established. If the group dominates, it creates practices that reinforce and perpetuate the original judgment and power arrangements.
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not because of the natural implications of the legal regime or laws, but
because of a particular, ideological interpretation assigned to the laws
and rules. Whether that ideological interpretation succeeds is dependent
on the mechanisms society invents to conform with or challenge that
interpretation.2 3

Finally, my analysis of land registration in Kenya hopes to challenge, or at least modify, some of the rigid assumptions of the resurgent
neo-liberal orthodoxy.2 By looking at the land registration experience in
Kenya in light of the recent promises of new prosperity founded on formal, secure property rights reflected in a registered title, I intend to draw
the attention of law and development scholars to the following lessons:
1. A misunderstanding of neo-classical assumptions and models
regarding how markets work and the institutions necessary for
the optimum functioning of the market can lead to a prescription of counter-productive rigid legal regimes;"
2. The land registration regime in Kenya failed to result in the
anticipated economic consequences and this failure could
have been foreseen with a proper understanding of the institutions whose evolution and6 impact shape economic
opportunities and performance;

23.
See discussion infra Section VIIJ.
24.
Development economics as a distinct branch of economics was largely based on
structuralist claims that problems facing developing countries were due to structural impediments in the international and domestic economy requiring significant state intervention.
However, neo-classical economists of the 1980s argued that economic stagnation in developing countries was a byproduct of poorly designed economic policies and excessive State
interference in the economy. As a result of disillusionment with the rate of development in
most developing countries and the negative effects of Official Development Aid (ODA), neoclassical assumptions of methodological individualism, the rational utility maximizing model,
and the role of markets in the economy regained sway in the so-called "long decade of the
1980s." See JAMES G. CARRIER, MEANINGS OF THE MARKET: THE FREE MARKET IN WESTERN
CULTURE (1997). The effect of this neo-classical resurgence was basically to shoot down
development economics with its structural assumptions-which was "hounded out of economics departments, international financial institutions and journals, in an ideological counter
revolution." Kari Levitt, Reclaiming Development Economics, International Development
Economics Associates (Nov. 6, 2001), at http://www.networkideas.orglfeathm/nov200l/
ft06_DevelopmentEconomics.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2003). The triumph of the resurgent
neo-classical theory was announced by Deepak Lal in 1983 when he concluded that "development economics" lacked both formal rigor and empirical support. DEEPAK LAL, THE
POVERTY OF 'DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS' (1983).
25.
Here, I merely extend and supplement the critiques put forth by David Trubek and
March Galanter of the first "law and development movement." See David M. Trubek & Marc
Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062 (1974).
26.
I build on the scholarship in political economy that highlights the importance of
institutions in economic reform. E.g., ROBERT BATES, OPEN-ECONOMY POLITICS (1997);
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3. The national elite in developing countries might be able to
capture the World Bank's development projects (which typically insist on a particular understanding of property
arrangements and impose this understanding on developing
countries) to reform property arrangements to lead to a process of perverse development.
I.

DEFINING AND PROBLEMATIZING LAND REGISTRATION

Technically speaking, land registration (or land titling) is simply the
keeping of public records of all transactions affecting land.28 Or as Tony
Burns defines it: "Land titling is a policy intervention to introduce systems to formally recognize rights in land and enable the state and
individuals to trade in these rights. 29
Two operative systems are ordinarily used for land registration: the
registration of deeds and documents and the registration of titles.30 The
former, often described as a negative system of registration, entails the
maintenance of a public register in which documents affecting interests
in land are copied or abstracted. The latter is the maintenance of an authoritative record, kept in public office, of the rights to clearly defined
units of land as vested for the time being in some particular person or
body, and the limitations, if any, to which these rights are subject."
As these definitions make clear, land registration as a technical exercise is completely agnostic as to the kind of substantive rights actually
Robert H. Bates & Paul Collier, The Politics and Economics of Policy Reform in Zambia, in
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS IN ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM 387 (Robert Bates &
Anne Krueger eds., 1991); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
27.
Here I extend the "second generation" critiques of "law and development" scholars.
E.g., James Thuo Gathii, The Limits of the New InternationalRule of Law on Good Governance, in LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 207 (Obiora & Quashigah eds.,
1999); GOOD GOVERNANCE AND LAW: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (Julio Faundez ed.,

1997);

KERRY RITTICH, RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING:

LAW, DISTRIBUTION AND GENDER IN MARKET REFORM

TION, LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

(2002);

KERRY RITTICH, GLOBALIZA-

(2002); James Thuo Gathii, Retelling Good Governance

Narrativeson Africa's Economic and PoliticalPredicaments:Continuitiesand Discontinuities
in Legal Outcomes Between Markets and States, 45 VILL. L. REV. 971 (2000).
28.
Daniel Wachter & John English, The World Bank's Experience With Rural Land
Titling (World Bank Env't Dep't, Divisional Working Paper No. 1992-35, 1992).
29.
Tony Bums et al., Land Titling Experience In Asia (1998), available at
http://www.surv.ufl.edu/publicationslandconf96/Bums.PDF (last visited Nov. 14, 2003).
30.
The Torrens System is a land registration system invented by Robert Torrens and in
which the government is the keeper of the master record of all land and their owners. In the
system, a land title certificate suffices to show full, valid and indefeasible title. See ROBERT
STEIN, TORRENS TITLE (1991).
31.
Id.
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registered. Registration is a technical process. The type of rights,
whether private or public, communal or individual, market-based or
state-based, is of no consequence to the registration system.32 Registration is simply the act of mapping the rights that different individuals or
groups have to a unit of land on paper and keeping a record thereof. It
neither privileges, nor requires anything of, an individual or communal
ownership system; it neither favors private nor public property. 33 It is

neutral as to the exact system or pattern that would emerge after the registration exercise is complete.
Despite this agnostic meaning of land registration, land registration
has been used to predetermine the content of the property rights being
registered. In such a situation, rather than technically mapping or capturing existing legal rights, registration is used to, or results in, a
transformation of legal rights. Therefore, what policy makers often have
in mind when they talk of land registration is more than just the capturing of rights of these groups in formal title. By advocating for land
registration, they often mean or hope for a reorganization and transformation of group and individual rights. This reorganization of property
rights entails a choice of interpretation of what particular rights to register and in whose name to register them. To the extent that this choice is
not inevitable and that it is masked or denied in practice, this process is
ideological.34
The remainder of this Article explains how land registration in
Kenya involved more than merely capturing the customary rights in land
32.
In other words, using the common idiom used to describe property, land registration does
not in any way prejudge which combinations of the sticks in the bundle should be called property.
The decision of which sticks are in a person's bundle, and which are necessarily implicated by the
act of registration must be made independently. See BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE PARADOXES OF
LEGAL SCIENCE

129 (1928).

33.
I deliberately but consciously use the terms "private" and "public" here to convey the
popular understanding that it is actually possible to distinguish "private" property from "public"
property. The truth, of course, is that there are elements of each in every property right. See generally Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611 (1988).
(arguing that the search for the "private" owner often yields wrong, unjust and shortsighted conclusions). The same argument applies to "communal" versus "individual" property. See Sylvia
Kang'ara, Conceptions of Property in Africa and The West (unpublished S.J.D. Dissertation, Harvard Law School) (copy on file with author).
34.
This process is actually ideological in two different senses. At the general meta level, it is
ideological in the sense that it is a mechanism for legitimating a particular type of society. The
masking or the denying of the choice in interpretation is a deliberate discourse aimed at justifying
the choice itself. It is therefore "the product of the underlying structure of economic forces and
relations, which it legitimates." A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, supra note 22, at 291. It is ideological in a second sense since the privileged choice is but one of the many possible choices of available
interpretations. Each choice is independent from, but reflects and is influenced by, a set of actual
economic and distributional consequences. Id. at 13-15; see also KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND
UTOPIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 70-78 (Louis Wirth et al. trans.,
1936).
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and recording them. The registration process in Kenya involved a measure of extinguishing entitlements as well as inventing new entitlements.
This claim should not be confused with saying that the registration of
land per se is an ideological exercise. Rather, it is to make the claim that
the registration process involves making a number of decisions based on
the interpretation that one assigns to a set of concepts. However, the fact
that individuals may interpret the various claims differently makes each
interpretation a choice. What is ideological is not the registration process
per se but the fact that the interpretive choices made are universalized by
an elaborate discourse aimed at masking the fact that they are choices.35
But I have a consolation to Western property rights scholars who
may have thus far interpreted my argument as the inapplicability of the
Western property model to the African situation.36 I hope to demonstrate
that the extent of extinguishment and invention of entitlements in the
Kenyan land registration process was not necessitated by the Western
property system, it was actually only necessitated by a desire to see a
particular evolution of the property system in Kenya. In any event, the
absolute and individualistic model of property the registration process
attempted to establish has probably never existed even in the Western
world, but is based on a 19th Century laissezfaire ideal.37 The aim of the
registration system in Kenya was not to capture entitlements of different
individuals under the customary system and record them in formal title.
The ideological motive behind the registration appears to have been a
need to reorganize the land ownership system so that the land ended up
in the hands of economic actors deemed to be more efficient and productive users of the land. However, even issues of efficiency and
productivity are moot. Land registration cannot be shown in any determinate, objectively verifiable way to result in a more efficient
distribution of land resources. This is in part because the arguments upon
which the efficiency argument rests are ideological as well.
II.

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

It is not given that land registration produces economic and social
consequences that can be determined a priori,though this seems to be the

A CRITIQUE OFADJUDICATION, supra note 22, at 11.
35.
36.
The distinctions once posited between "Western" and "Non-Western" conceptions of
property have come under intense intellectual criticism lately. The result is that these are no longer
settled questions, sociologically or jurisprudentially. For an analysis of the history, evolution and
ultimate critique of these distinctions, see Kang'ara, supra note 33.
37.
Gregory S. Alexander & Grazyna Skapska, Introduction to A FOURTH WAY? at ix, xv
(Gregory S. Alexander & Grazyna Skapska eds., 1994).
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received wisdom." The following analysis shows that where such consequences ensue, it is not because of the effects of the registration per se.
Rather, it is due to a particular understanding of what registration means
and entails as well as a particular channeling of competing notions of registration. Where promised positive economic consequences follow
registration, it is because the particular interpretation has converged with
other factors such as growth of factor markets and an acceptance of the
ideology on which the registration results are interpreted.3 9
What the above assertion means is that even where land registration is
accepted and carried out under a given set of common denominators, it is
still possible for the outcome to be different from the one envisaged by
orthodox economic theorizing. In fact, the claim is that the only possible
way to determine a priori what outcome would ensue, is if one insisted on
a particular understanding of the different notions which form the set of
common denominators. This would mean insisting on and having the ability to implement and/or enforce only selected interpretations of the
different conceptions.
Thus, the only way to debate the economic consequences of land registration is by being ideological. 0 One must be able to choose a particular
interpretation to the relevant set of concepts and then proceed to enforce
that particular interpretation. Invariably, those who lose from that particular interpretation-or those who would gain from an alternative
interpretation-would contest such a choice. Therefore, the interpreter
must contend with competing interpretations. One way to do this is to use
the state's monopoly over violence to forcibly silence dissenting interpretations. However, the more subtle and economical way is to persuade
those who hold, or would otherwise hold, competing interpretations that
the particular interpretation being used is objective, scientific and universal.' It is in this sense that registration of land can be ideological. 2
38.
The standard economic argument is that a clarification of property rights enhances market efficiency because it induces security and lowers transaction costs leading to a creation of a land
market. See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2d ed. 1997); Lee J.
Alston et al., The Determinantsand Impact of Property Rights: Land Tles on the Brazilian Frontier, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 25 (1999); Byamugisha, supra note 5.
39.
Some economists and political economists readily admit that the expected economic
benefits of registration will follow only if imperfections in factor markets are removed as well. See
Klaus Deininger & Gershon Feder, Land Institutions and Land Markets (World Bank Pol'y Res.
Working Paper No. 2014, 1998), available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/
Workpapers/wps2000seriestwps2O14/wps2Ol4.pdf (last visited Nov. 14,2003).
40.
See discussion infra note 22.
41.
In Gramscian terms, it is necessary for the state to attain hegemony, i.e., to organize the
consent of all the groups in support of the interpretation that it prefers. See ANTONIO GRAMsci, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowel-Smith eds. & trans., 1971).
42.
Susan Marks identifies five strategies which ideology typically deploys, pointing out that
most often it combines them: (1) universalization:making social and political institutions appear
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The effectiveness of land registration depends on the existence and
acceptance by all social groups and economic actors of a set of givens.
These givens constitute a conceptual framework which consists of a
number of concepts which provide the universe in which a process such
as land registration operates at an optimal level. These include concepts
such as democracy, human rights, private property rights, economic development, economic efficiency and the rule of law.
It is possible that the many different economic actors share a common conceptual framework. This was true of Kenya during the time
period this study covers: the mid-1950s through the 1990s. ' The many
different economic actors included members of the national elite who
espoused African socialism' and their political opponents who styled
themselves as Marxists or Socialists. There were no wild differences in
terms of the political variables shared by all these actors:
In the context of Kenya, "capitalist development" ... enjoys
popular support ... Indeed, Marxists writing about Kenya politics-as opposed to more ethereal literary and philosophical
impartial, inclusory, and rooted in considerations of mutual interest while masking differential levels
of social power, (2) reification: the process by which human products appear as if they were material things and then dominate those who produce them, hence making people and cease recognizing
the social world as a product of human endeavor, instead see it as fixed and unchangeable reality;
(3) naturalization:making extant social arrangements appear obvious and self-evident, hence
stabilizing domination by making it impossible to imagine more symmetrical power relations;
(4) rationalization:construction of a chain of reasoning of which the status quo is the logical
conclusion, making it seem as though there are good reasons why things are as they are, and
making change irrational; and (5) narrativization:construction of histories of progress setting
the status quo in historical context, thus imbuing the subsisting arrangements with respect and
perpetuation because they are venerable and/or they represent progress. See Susan Marks, Big
Brother is Bleeping Us-With the Message that Ideology Doesn't Matter, 12 E.J. INT'L L. 109
(2001). In the land registration proposals in Kenya, as the story below shows, the strategies
used by different social groups included universalizationand naturalization.To the extent that
the government also equated land registration with the need for modernization and development, it also deployed the narrativizationstrategy.
43.
I am, perhaps, simplifying a very complex situation in Kenya in the period immediately following independence. However, aside from some Marxist elements, renown mainly
for harsh rhetoric rather than serious Marxist belief, there appeared to be some faith in these
concepts.
44.
See REPUBLIC OF KENYA, AFRICAN SOCIALISM AND ITS APPLICATION TO PLANNING
IN KENYA

(1965). For example:

These African traditions cannot be carried over indiscriminately to a modem, monetary economy. The need to develop and invest requires credit and a credit economy
rests heavily on a system of land titles and their registration. The ownership of land
must, therefore, be made more definite and explicit if land consolidation and development are to be fully successful ... Indeed, it is a fundamental characteristic of
African Socialism that society has a duty to plan, guide and control the uses of all
productive resources.

Id. at 10.
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Marxists-do not take a non-capitalist development route seriously as an alternative for Kenya. In fact, if we ignore
terminology and mode of analysis to focus on policy alternatives, we find that the alternatives being considered by Marxists
are essentially identical to those being debated within Kenya's
Ministry of Economic Planning and Development ... In short,
Marxists and non-Marxists are as one in their acceptance of a
capitalist development path for Kenya. n5
Other actors competing for a stake in the interpretation of these concepts were trade unions, peasants or rural farmers, representatives of
social groups, representatives of international capital and investment
groups and development agencies such as the World Bank.46
All these actors shared a common conceptual framework for understanding and making ethical claims in the post-independence national
situation. The debate was not whether land registration was necessary
but who and what interests to register. However, as discussed below, different actors desired different outcomes from the registration process.
One would expect land registration to be much more predictable
granted that the actors shared this common framework. However, the
influence of the common framework cannot be determined a priori. This
is because the many different concepts constituting the common framework have many diverse interpretations, each of which can be correct.
This makes each concept highly manipulable.
The choice of meaning is not driven by a natural meaning of the
concept, but by extraneous desires and interests of the different groups.
These motivating interests are hidden in the simple act of interpreting the
concepts. Hence, understanding the impact of registration on economic
development in Kenya involves understanding how each interest group
exploited the ambiguity of each term and concept associated with land
CHRISTOPHER LEO, LAND AND CLASS IN KENYA 9 (1984). It should be noted that
45.
Leo wrote this in 1984, long before the fall of Communism and the rise of market triumphalism. Furthermore, recent political commentary concerning the political spectrum of Kenya's
political elite at the time of independence stated:
Kenya's political elite have no major ideological differences. Even ideological and
programmatic alternatives. In his book Not Yet Uhuru, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga
aptly described political parties in Kenya as 'loose amalgams of people with diverse
tendencies'. The situation has not changed.
Jaindi Kisero, Reforms Pact Signals Victory for Moderates, DAILY NATION, Jan. 31, 2001
(internal citations omitted).
Apart from its general brief to alleviate world poverty, the World Bank had given
46.
Kenya a loan guaranteed by the British Government which, of course, it was interested in
getting repaid. As I discuss below, this loan was used by the newly independent Kenyan government to purchase back the land owned by Europeans.

Re-Examining the Role of PrivateProperty

Winter 2004]

registration. They did this to pursue their own agendas and thus profoundly shaped Kenya's economic development and the operation of
land registration. It is interesting to note is that each group appealed to
the scientific or neutral character of these concepts.
III. Two

REFORM PROGRAMS;

TWO

IDEOLOGIES

When talking of land registration and reform in Kenya, it is useful to
distinguish two registration initiatives:
1. The enclosure, consolidation and registration of plots on African areas in the reserves that began4 with the Swynnerton
Plan 47 of 1954 and still goes on today; 1
2. The resettlement of Africans in the White Highlands, an area
which had been bought back by the independent government
from those Europeans who exercised .
the
• 49exit option bargained for in the Independence negotiations.

47.
The Swynnerton Plan was a comprehensive policy document prepared for the colonial Government by the then Assistant Commissioner of Agriculture in Kenya, Mr.
Swynnerton, aimed at alleviating the land grievances among the natives in Kenya. See R. J. M.
SWYNNERTON, A PLAN TO INTENSIFY AFRICAN AGRICULTURE IN KENYA (1955) [hereinafter

Swynnerton Plan].
48.
Reference to "African areas" here means the sum of all the land legally held by
natives especially after the implementation of the 1933 Report of the Kenya Land Commission. REPORT OF THE KENYA LAND COMMISSION (1933); see Colony of Kenya, Ordinance
XXVII (Dec. 1938); Colony of Kenya, Ordinance XXVIII (Dec. 1938); Colony of Kenya,
Proclamation No. 20 (1939). The effect of this assortment of legislation was that the areas that
had been gazetted as European Highlands remained solely for use by the white settlers. However, in the other areas specifically known as native reserves, temporary native reserves,
Native Leasehold Areas or "D lands," natives could acquire land and have equal rights with
other races in land acquisition. Reference in this Article to "African areas" refers to the sum of
native areas, as defined by the 1939 Native Lands Trusts Ordinance. Ordinance XXVIII, supra, § 70 (providing for the extinguishment of all native rights in land outside native areas).
For a full description of these areas and how the boundaries evolved over time, see C.K.
MEEK, LAND LAW AND CUSTOM IN THE COLONIES
GINS OF EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN KENYA

76-99 (1949); M.P.K.

SORRENSON, ORI-

(1968).

49.
The White Highlands refers to the land set aside for European settlement. All native
rights to these lands were extinguished by various legislative instruments including the Native
Lands Trust Ordinance of 1939. Ordinance XXVIII, supra note 48. According to Meek, the
alienated lands totaled 10,832 square miles by 1937. MEEK, supra note 48; see also Ordinance
XXVII, supra note 48 (defining the boundaries of the White Highlands). It is important to
emphasize that these lands were bought back from the Europeans. It corrects the wrong implication that this initiative was land reform and gives the impression that this was merely a
redistributive scheme or a nationalization exercise to redress the earlier colonial appropriation.
Second, the government requirement to buy the lands from the Europeans first started the
World Bank's involvement with the land registration efforts in Kenya.
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Different ideological battles accompanied each initiative, both before and after independence. There have been plenty of ideological
battles regarding the land reform associated with the first type of initiative. However, in the second process of reform, there have been
surprisingly few ideological battles. For more than thirty years after independence there was no significant contest over the meaning of reform
as far as this aspect of reform is concerned. This was so until the introduction of multi-partyism in 1992.50
The dominant reasoning is that since the lands in this category were
being bought from Europeans, no indigenous or customary laws were
applicable. This interpretation would, of course, be consistent with the
Colonial Ordinances, specifically the Native Lands Trusts Ordinance of
1939, which provided for the extinguishment of all native rights in land
outside the boundaries of the native areas.5
The decision not to reopen the debate on the expropriation of the
White Highlands after independence is problematic. This decision was
inconsistent with other reforms taking place in Kenya at the time. For
example, the reforms in the first program were thought of as specifically
mapping customary rights to land into formal title. The differing treatment of customary rights to land can only be understood in ideological
terms. Aside from sanctifying colonial expropriation, there are two contradictions in this position.
First, the argument is based on the implicit assumption that conquest
and colonization amounted in the conquering force acquiring radical title
to the land.52 This is the only argument consistent with the interpretation
of extinguishment of customary laws and claims on the basis of expropriation. This interpretation is not problematic merely because of its
moral opprobrium. It is also at odds with the intellectual framework of
50.
There was a brief but lively contest during the Lancaster Constitutional conference
where those who favored federalism challenged the dominant view about the redistribution of
land in areas hitherto held by the Europeans. Y.P. GHAI & J.P.W.P. McAUSLAN, PUBLIC LAW
AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN KENYA

73-77 (1970). This strand of reasoning was quickly sub-

dued, and met an untimely death when the two major parties of the time merged. The two
parties are the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which was the ruling party, and remained in power until December 2002, and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), which
was itself an amalgamation of several small parties. Id. at 212; see also Wunyabari Maloba,
Nationalism and Decolonization, 1947-1963, in A MODERN HISTORY OF KENYA 1895-1980
173, 193-194 (William R. Ochieng' ed., 1989).
51.
Ordinance No. XXVIII, supra note 48, § 70. For a statement of this thread of reasoning, see Gibson K. Kuria, Who Owns Land in the Ri Walley? SUNDAY NATION, Apr. 23,
1995.
The United States Supreme Court had consistently used this strand of reasoning in
52.
cases involving Native Americans. This started with the celebrated case of Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 5 L. Ed. 681 (1823), holding that the right to discovery
abrogates all existing native interests in the land and gives an exclusive right to extinguish the
native title of occupancy.
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those who accept extinguishment of native customary claims to land but
point out that it occurred at the point of independence through the negotiated process sealed by a Republican Constitution. The question then
becomes whether any customary claims survived the independence bargain.
The contradiction is palpable if one considers the fact that land reform in the first type of initiative (the mapping of customary rights into
formal title) was to proceed on the basis of customary claims. Not even
the independence bargain muted legally recognizable customary claims
to land. One interpretation would hold that the only customary claims
that survived the independence bargain are those related to land in the
native areas. The question ultimately arises concerning the justification
of differential treatment of customary laws.
In the native areas where land reform of the first type occurred, customary laws formed the basis for registration. 3 However, it was
imagined that once the customary claims had been established through a
process of land adjudication and registered under the new registration
statutes that the registered parcel would be removed from the realm of
customary laws. The High Court in Kenya ruled title free from the multiple claims and procedures of customary law:
[R]ights in land under customary law are extinguished upon registration ... the fact that [the appellants] may well have
customary right to occupation of the land, such right is not an
overriding interest within the true meaning and intent of Section
30(g) of the [Registered Lands] Act. Accordingly, they cannot
assert such a right against a registered proprietor or his' charge.
That holding puts the applicant completely out of court.
Following this line of reasoning, it is clear that customary claims to
land are excludable only upon registration of the land under the Registered Lands Act. The converse of the argument is that insofar as no such
registration has taken place, customary claims are operative and should
53.
See The Registered Land Act pmbl., Laws of Kenya Ch. 300 (1985).
54.
Wangari wanjohi & Wambui Wanjohi v. Continental Credit Company Ltd., HCCC
[High Court of Civil Cases] No. 3578 of 1987 (Kenya), reprintedin 14 NAIROBI L. MONTHLY
42 (1989). The judges were interpreting the Registered Lands Act. Section 28 of the Act
makes the rights conferred on the registered proprietor indefensible save and except overriding. One such exception was a subject of contention in this case. Section 30(g) states that the
rights of the registered proprietor can be overridden by, "the rights of a person in possession or
actual occupation of land to which he is entitled in right only of such possession or occupation, save where inquiry is made of such person and the rights are not disclosed." Registered
Land Act, supra note 53, § 30(g).
In the case, the appellants had made the claim that they had the rights of a personal possession under customary law. Hence, it is the ruling that customary laws are extinguished upon
registration of land that was dispositive of the case.

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 25:467

be given legal effect. Arguing that customary claims are excluded by
registration appears to displace the argument that registration is based on
customary claims. If the registration process was in fact based on customary claims, the act of registration would not exclude any yet
unregisteredcustomary claims. It would have been different if the court
had ruled that registration is conclusive of the customary claims in the
parcel in question.
This alternate acceptance and denial of customary claims aspect of
the transformation of property relations in Kenya is puzzling. Land adjudication and registration is argued to proceed on the basis of custom,
implying that registration is an exercise to capture customary rights to
land in formal manner, a title. However, the Courts ruled that once registration has taken place, one can no longer raise any unregistered
customary claims-not because of res judicata but because registration
itself extinguishes customary claims.
The provisions of section 143 of the Registered Lands Act complete
the paradox.55 The section precludes anyone from challenging a first registration even on grounds of fraud. The implication is that even if a
person is registered as proprietor of a parcel of land without due regard
to custom, that registration remains unimpeachable. This is true notwithstanding the fact that customary claims were intended to be the basis for
registration.
It turns out therefore that beyond rhetoric, hardly any genuine interest in mapping customary claims existed in the new registration scheme.
The combination of the adjudication and registration processes with judicial practice operated to narrow the range of possible effects and
56
impact of land registration. The sum effect is to encourage the registra55.
Registered Land Act, supra note 53, § 143.
56.
For example, Celestine Itumbi Nyamu discusses the concept of land registration
and male head of household:
One example [of how the adjudication process is designed to narrow the bureaucratic criterion for deciding who the individual owner is, and hence function to
exclude], is the established practice of registering male heads of households as the
official owners of land that is used by families or lineages. A vague resort to custom
gives a 'natural' appearance to the fact that the programs result largely in the registration of men as 'heads of household' and exclude women's interests from the
official recognition conferred by title.
Celestine Itumbi Nyamu, Gender, Culture, And Property Relations In A Pluralistic Social
Setting 213 (2000) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file with the
Harvard Law Library).
Helena Alviar discusses a similar usage of "heads of household" category in Latin America land reforms as well. See Helena Alviar, The Place of Economic Development and
Feminist Theory in Legal Reform and Policy Design in Latin-America (2001) (S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file at Harvard Law Library).
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tion of individual proprietors with no encumbrances whatsoever. This
effect is not warranted by the registration exercise itself, but by a combination of interpretations of several concepts critical to the registration
process. Alternative interpretations of these concepts were equally feasible but not chosen for ideological reasons.
Another inconsistency makes the ideology more explicit. In the second reform initiative (the redistribution of land previously held by
Europeans), there was no attempt to use customary rights as the basis for
land redistribution. It was taken for granted that the parcels of land
would be sold on a "willing-seller, willing-buyer basis."57 The question
arises as to why customary principles were employed in the registration
process but not in the resettling of Africans in the White Highlands. It is
no use to point out that section 114 of the Constitution restored the use
of customary laws in these areas." That same section could have restored
the use of customary laws in the White Highlands as well.
This. contradictory rendering of customary principles in the native
areas and White Highlands is crucial for ideological interests. The interest was to progressively establish a class of people who individually
owned parcels of land as free hold titles in fee simple absolute. Such an
outcome required the progressive but eventual extinguishment of customary claims in land. As far as the White Highlands were concerned, it
was administratively and politically feasible to effect an immediate extinguishment to coincide with the birth of the new nation. As for the
native areas, the extinguishment had to await the registration of lands
under the Registered Lands Act.
Viewing land registration in Kenya through this lens explains why I
resisted the simplistic definition of land registration as the technical
process of recording interests in land in order to assign titles to the rightful owners as a means to enhance security of title in land. 9 Rather,
registration is a systematic attempt to transform property relations in a
society. This transformation entails results based policy choices of the
reformer. Thus, it is not just a program for capturing unregistered customary claims in land and registering them formally, but a program
targeted to achieve certain preferred outcomes.
I am interested in this process for two reasons. First, what is touted
as a technico-legal program is in fact a program for massive social reorganization. The transformation envisaged is not natural and inevitable,
but a political choice. The technical language in which the process is
57.
For a spirited defense of the system, but without an acknowledgement of the contradiction with the use of customs in the "native areas," see Kuria, supra note 5 1.
58.
KENYA CONST. (Constitution Act, 1963) Ch. V (Protection of Fundamental Rights
and Freedoms of the Individual), § 75.
59.
See supra Section III.
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encapsulated as well as words such as "capturing" and "registration" are
only a means of mystifying the reality of social reorganization. That social reorganization is ideological because it aims to justify a particular
form of capitalist economic development in Kenya. The charge of ideology does not necessarily mean that the social reorganization envisaged
was evil, but that the registration process legitimated the preferred social
transformation.
Second, I am interested in examining the precise ways a social transformation, envisaged in this way, can be modified, qualified or subverted
by social praxis. The social praxis that I examine below is one that was
organized in terms of customary norms to challenge the transformation
of property relations that would otherwise have been ushered in by the
particular interpretation of the registration process. Such an examination
both buttresses the argument about the ideological content of the registration process and challenges the conventional neo-classical
assumptions about how land registration leads to determinate processes
that result in specific economic consequences.
IV. IDEOLOGY IN THE REGISTRATION PROCESS

Duncan Kennedy has argued that ideology influences adjudication
by structuring legal discourse and through strategic choice in interpretation. 6° He has further argued that denying the presence of ideology in
adjudication leads to political results different from those that would occur in a transparent situation.6' In other words, the illusion created by the
appearance of determinacy contributes to social patterns rather than just
mystify them. People are less likely to accept patterns if they understood
that the appearance of determinacy is a mask for determination by political actors.62
This is most clear in situations where rights are mapped from one legal system to another such as the land registration in Kenya. We can
understand this scenario by looking at registration in two stages. The
first stage is the exact moment of capturing different actors' claims and
mapping them into the Western category. At this stage, rules had to be
made about how to adjudicate the different claims by the natives so that
valid claims could be registered.
Two chronological methods were utilized to adjudicate these claims.
Claims were adjudicated pursuant to the Land Adjudication Ordinance.63
60.
61.
62.
63.

Kennedy, supra note 22, at 4.

Id.
Id.
The Land Consolidation Act, Laws of Kenya Ch. 283 (rev. ed. 1977) (1964).
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This entailed adjudicating competing land rights and deciding in what
form to register them. While the rhetoric was that customary norms were
being used to determine the valid claims, in truth, traditional and legal
inventions occurring at this stage aimed at establishing a registration system that heavily favored individual ownership.' This does not mean that
there was anything inherent in the Western registration system that necessitated preference for the individual owner.65 Rather, the particular
interpretation and implementation of the system created this preference.
As others have shown, the idea that there is sanctity of absolute, individual ownership in the Western property holding system is misplaced.6
The Western system is facially neutral as to which property arrangement
the majority prefers.
Yet, there are many ways in which the registration procedures at the
adjudication stage displayed a preference for individual ownership. One
such involved registering an adjudicated piece in the name of the male
head of the household. 6 The claim here was that the male head was customarily the legal landowner. However, no such custom existed. This
was an invention given primacy by those who were interpreting the customary norms.68
Furthermore, registration of the male head as the owner under the
new scheme radically changed the powers, privileges and rights of the
other members in the household in a manner hitherto unknown.
Registration entailed several consequences: the absolute power of
alienation, use and transfer. No such radical powers accompanied
ownership in the traditional society. It is not that the act of capturing
traditional claims per se transformed the quantum of property rights.
Rather, the method of mapping and capturing the customary claims
induced this effect. The interpretation and registration of the customary
and the Western norms had this effect, not the actual act of capturing and
mapping the claims from one system to the other. In other words, it
would have been perfectly possible to ease into a registration system that69
captured the customary system of land holding more accurately.
However, in the process of capturing these rights, some of the secondary
rights in land (e.g. usufructual rights) over which the participants in the
economy had invested considerable social capital to maintain, were
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See Nyamu, supra note 56.
Singer, supra note 33.
Id.
Nyamu, supra note 56.
Id.; see also ELIZABETH COLSON,

TRADITION AND CONTRACT: THE PROBLEM OF

ORDER (1974).

I say more accurately because I retain my doubts whether it would be possible to be
69.
completely accurate given the struggle for meaning in both the Western and the customary
systems.
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erased. The argument that it was necessary to privilege the individualoriented aspects of ownership is therefore disingenuous and a product of
ideological interpretation rather than an inevitable consequence of the
change in system.
The fact that ideological stakes were strong in the particular brand of
interpretation given to what it meant to register land in Kenya is captured
by historian Wunyabari Maloba:
Throughout this exercise [land registration], the [colonial] provincial administration [i.e. the civil service], which had a more
vested interest in the matter, was guided by political considerations ...[They] felt they had to take advantage of the emergency
to implement what to them seemed like an agrarian revolution:
the pooling together of fragmented landholdings to produce one
piece of land under individual tenure. It was their belief that
unless they pushed hard, more detainees would be released and
probably disrupt the program. 70
In any event, the very nature of customary claims makes adjudication based on such claims extremely problematic and susceptible to
ideological capture. This is because the adjudication process falsely assumes that customs can be precisely ascertained as to assign absolute
and irreversible rights based on precise verification. Customary norms
are based on "recurring mode of interaction among individuals and
groups" while legal rights seek to imbue the rights holder with forwardlooking entitlements. 7' As such, general statements that present customary norms as rigid and objectively ascertainable are merely ideological:
"For every occasion that a person thinks or says, 'that cannot be done, it
is against the rules, or violates the categories,' there is another occasion
the same individual says, 'Those
rules or categories do not (or should
72
not) apply to this situation.'

,

Still, there have been some glimpses in the whole system that show
discomfort with the way the system attempted the mapping. The examples show that the registration exercise engaged a definite preference. To
the extent that this preference was driven by ideological motives, attempts to universalize can often be detected in their contradictory effects
at certain critical junctures. As discussed below, I define these "glimpses
at discomfort" as legal chips used to challenge and subvert the strong
70.
REVOLT

71.
THEORY

72.
(1978).

WUNYABARI 0.

MALOBA,

MAU MAU AND KENYA, AN ANALYSIS OF A PEASANT

144 (1993).
ROBERTO UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL
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preference for individual ownership in situations where society's norms
expect the application of more communal aspects. They are legal chips
because they are stratagems that are carried out by official government
agencies, economic actors, individual litigants and judges using legal
means. The effect is to tamper with the strong individually oriented bias
in the registration process. I have identified, without claiming to being
exhaustive, at least six ways in which this has happened:
73
1. The enactment and implementation of Land Control Act;
2.

The enactment and Implementation of Land (Group) Representatives Law;74

of Statutes to Regulate
3. The enactment and implementation
75
Land Use and Development;
4. The discovery76 and operation of the African trust doctrine by
the judiciary;
5.

The enactment of specific safety valve laws to regulate statutory sales and foreclosures; 77 and

6. The operation of the Married Women's Property Act of 1882
to regulate statutory sales 8
In each of the six ways the legal terrain is altered to temper the
strong ideological bias for individual ownership displayed in the land
registration process. Therefore the choice of the institutional regime to
capture different entitlements in land in formal title leaves unanswered
the questions of how to administer and who to register in whose name
and for which interests. In answering these questions political preferences crowd out other competing interests in the same property. By
packaging the preferences as objective or the only available interpretation of the institutional regime the process becomes ideological. The
process denies other available choices and is cloaked as universal and
objective.

73.
The Land Control Act, Laws of Kenya Ch. 302, revised ed. 1981 (1979).
74.
The Land (Group Representatives) Act, Laws of Kenya Ch. 287, revised ed. 1970
(1968).
75.
See, e.g., The Coffee Act, Laws of Kenya Ch. 333 (rev. ed. 1979) (1972); The Tea
Act, Laws of Kenya Ch. 343 (rev. ed. 1979) (1972).
76.
See discussion infra Section IX.B.4.
77.
See discussion infra Section IX.B.5.
Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75 (Eng.).
78.
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V. THE PARADOX OF THE KENYAN CASE:

A

PARALLEL PROPERTY SYSTEM

There are five different land registration regimes under which titles

to land can be registered in Kenya. 79 Each registration regime is created
by one of five registration statutes, namely: Registered Land Act, ° Government Lands Act,8' Registration of Titles Act,82 Land Titles Act, 3 and
Registration of Documents ActM Basically, each regime provides for fee
simple or analogous ownership of the registered parcel of land. 5 They
limit the number of persons who can be registered as legal owners to one
parcel of land, although recognizing the trust doctrine in which one legal
owner may be registered as a trustee for others. 6
Differences have emerged in the impact that land registration has
had. They revolve not around the five different registration systems but
roughly on the category of land, size of holding and the type of person
holding the land. Categories of land have emerged which differ from
each other by how strictly the legal rules are applied and whether persons claiming rights to the land expect all legal aspects to be strictly
applied.
Two institutions have emerged to support or oppose the registration
system and a strict enforcement of its rules. A powerful set of economic
institutions support and supply the national elite with rhetoric supporting
the registration system and its entrenchment through the enactment of
subsequent laws to implement it. For land parcels owned by such elite,
the registration regimes and laws enforcing individual rights of the registered owner are strictly enforced. Any person dealing with this category of
lands expects the formal (statutory) law to be rigidly applied.
A second set of institutions supported by powerful traditional norms
and fear of political repercussions enabled the parallel existence of a

79.
We should note here that two systems of land registration operate in Kenya: registration of deeds and registration of title. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
80.
Registered Land Act, supra note 53.
81.
Laws of Kenya Ch. 280 (rev. ed. 1984) (1970).
82.
Id. Ch. 281 (rev. ed. 1982) (1962).
83.
Id. Ch. 282 (rev. ed. 1982) (1962).
84.
Id. Ch. 285 (rev. ed. 1980) (1962).
85.
Registered Land Act, supra note 53, §§ 24, 27.
86.
Id. §§ 27-28.
87.
My thinking in this regard has been influenced by discussions with Duncan Kennedy on the same and were originally inspired by his analysis of the U.S. housing situation.
See Duncan Kennedy, Some Thoughts About Typical U.S. Low Income Housing Markets in
Light of "Informality" Analysis (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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semi-traditional system of tenure."8 This was true even in cases where
land was already titled and registered.
The first set of institutions was sponsored and supported by the national elite and Western educated local elite who wanted to protect their
large tracts of land. This group yearned for the opportunity to be freed
from an ethnic system that extracted "certain goods and services from
the modern elite,"" because it possessed the ability to allocate and induce sanctions such as the ability to control allocation of land and elite
status. 90
The second set of institutions was sponsored and supported by rural
farmers and those set to gain economically from the rural sector. This
group included both rural farmers and representatives of international
capital and investment groups in Kenya. 9' Various strands of neoMarxists belonged to this group to the extent that they saw the mode of
registration pursued by the independence government as "imperialistic"
and "capitalistic".9 2 To the neo-Marxists ethnic control of land use and
allocation was desirable
if only to deny the state the land as a resource to
•
93
promote capitalism. Further, the continued ability of the rural masses to
control the land forestalled the possibility of a local bourgeoisie from

88.
My use of the terms "traditional" and "customary" norms throughout this paper,
though unqualified and synonymous, need a clarification. I consciously depart from the common rendering of custom as a static condition and aim to convey that many norms construed
as customary in the intense land competition surrounding political independence in Kenya
were a mixture of traditional and modem claims. This is not unique to Kenya or Africa.
Whenever changes occur in a society, different groups organize their claims and interests in
new ways as to benefit from such changes. See Elizabeth Colson, The Impact of the Colonial
Period on the Definition of Land Rights, in 3 COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 1870-1960 PROFILES
OF CHANGE: AFRICAN SOCIETY AND COLONIAL RULE 193 (Victor Turner ed., 1971) (discussing the changes that occurred in most of Africa and their impact on how different groups and
individuals conceived of, evaluated and established their land rights).
I would argue that Douglass North makes the same point in his thesis that individuals
and organizations decipher and evaluate the opportunities availed to them by the institutional
framework in determining what claims to make or what influence to exert and in what direction for institutional evolution to ensue. See NORTH, supra note 27. When a change occurs, the
individual or an organization is constrained by the institutions in place in deciding what claims
to make-but the institutions also shape the way the individual or organization will express
her claims. Id.
89.
Robert Bates, Ethnicity in Modem Africa, in EAST AFRICAN STUDIES XIV 42
(1973).
90.
Id.
91.
See LEO, supra note 45, at 17; see also Michael Cowen, Commodity Production in
Kenya's Central Province, in RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TROPICAL AFRICA 121 (Judith Heyer et
al eds., 1981).
92.
See Cowen, supra note 91.
93.
COLIN LEYS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEOCOLONIALISM 255-63 (1975).
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accumulating enough resources to force peasants out of their land to eke
94
out surplus.
For rural farmers, to the extent that land registration seemed poised
to break off the system of inducements and sanctions holding the ethnic
group together and enabling it to exert the loyalty of the educated elite,
land registration was unwelcome. However, land registration was still
desired insofar as it represented freedom from government confiscation.
The interests of international capital and investment groups in Kenya
was in retaining and enhancing the system of family holdings, especially
in areas where export crops such as tea, coffee, pyrethrum and cotton
were grown. 95 These multinational corporations supported policies that
promoted rather than diminish the rural, peasant sector for two reasons.
First, international corporations were oftentimes able to shape
smallholder production of export crops to their advantage. The government gave dominant players a free hand in regulating the industries they
were involved in as a way of ensuring quality control and the flow of
foreign exchange fetched in international markets. By controlling aspects
of each major agricultural industry, these international corporations were
able to control production conditions, thereby extracting surplus from
the production by small holder operators. 96 An example from the tea industry exemplifies this point:
From the 1950s onwards there was a parallel development of
smallholder tea cultivation. This scheme was instigated by the
colonial government under the Swynnerton Plan to develop cash
crops in African areas and it was later funded by two other agencies, the CDC and the World Bank ... It is clear that from the
outset the dominant tea-estate firms, such as Brooke Bond and
James Finlay, played an important role in shaping the conditions
under which the smallholder tea scheme developed. Brooke
Bond, for instance, acted as advisers on tea-growing and also assisted in the linking up of British machinery suppliers and the
smallholder tea factories. Before Africans were trained to oper94.
STEVEN LANGDON, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF KENYA 194-95 (1981). This could also be an anti-Marxist position to the extent that the
Marxist tradition is wedded to the notion of historical succession of modes of production. The
peasant mode of production is meant to give way to a capitalist society. However, here, it
would seem that the Marxists saw a possibility of the peasants surviving the onslaught of
capitalism, not giving way to it.
95.
Here I refer to multinational corporations operating in the agricultural and financial
sectors in Kenya, such as Brooke Bond Liebig, Barclays Bank, Lonrho, George Williamson,
Unilever, and James Finlay. Several book length works describe the activities of these corporations in Kenya. See LANGDON, supra note 94; LEYS, supra note 93; NICOLA SWAINSON, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM IN KENYA 1918-1977 (1980).
96.
SWAINSON, supra note 95, at 259-60.
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ate the factories, the major tea companies in Kenya, Brooke
Bond, James Finlay, and George Williamson, provided management and technical assistance to the smallholder factories. This
enabled them to directly influence the smallholder tea scheme
from the growing to the processing of tea ...[These multina-

tional companies] were able to work the smallholder tea scheme
to their own advantage by controlling plucking standards ...
[They] insisted that the smallholder leaf be of a higher standard
than the estates... This meant that Brooke Bond was able to
purchase the higher quality smallholder tea and blend it with its
own lower-quality tea.97

Second, some international investment groups were interested in
loaning inputs and investment money to small holder rural farmers and
using the unharvested crops as collateral. They would then acquire a
monopoly right to purchase the products of the crops from the farmers.
Most of these farms were being operated as family holdings where loose
traditional and customary norms determined tenure arrangements. A
strictly enforced registration system ousting traditional or customary
rights to land would have enabled entrepreneurial Kenyans to acquire
land and establish large farms not dependent on investment groups for
input credits or marketing abilities.98 As indicated below, investment
groups played heavily on the government's dependence on these crops
for its foreign exchange. In particular, they influenced the law affecting
major crops that prevented farmers from removing their acreage from the
production of these crops without express government permission.99
The dual system of tenurial enforcement can be explained as a compromise between the two groups. The modem, educated and political
elite desired to obtain their own parcels of land and break free from ethnic sanctions. The rural farmers desired to maintain their interlocking
Id. at 257-58.
97.
98.
This system acted as a bulwark against expected capitalist development since the
international investment groups formed a loose alliance with the rural peasant farmers. This
trend led Christopher Leo to remark that capitalistic development is proceeding in Kenya, "not
upon the rubble of a disintegrating peasant society, but upon the firm and well-established
foundation of a peasant mode of production that is still developing and expanding." LEO, supra note 45, at 7. In other words, the alliance between the peasants and the international
capital was facilitating the development of the peasant sector at the expense of rising capitalist
middle class that would otherwise profit from dealing with peasants.
99.
See The Coconut Preservation Act, Laws of Kenya Ch. 332 (rev. ed. 1983) (1962)
§§ 4, 9; The Coffee Act, supra note 75, §§ 17, 38(g); Coffee (Cultivation and Processing)
Rules, Laws of Kenya (rev. ed. 1979) (1972) § 3(1) (codification of Legal Notice No. 94/1962,
119/1963, 622/1963, 339/1966); The Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Act, Laws of Kenya Ch.
335 (rev. ed. 1967) (1962) § 41; The Pyrethrum Act, Laws of Kenya Ch. 340 (rev. ed. 1978)
(1962) § 12; The Sisal Industry Act, Laws of Kenya Ch. 341 (rev. ed. 1970) (1962) §§ 13(a),
14; The Tea Act, supra note 75, § 8.
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political and economic systems with embedded tenure arrangements. To
a large extent, the category of land affecting the modem elite was different from that affecting the rural farmers. Hence, the modem elite, as the
major political decision-makers, could easily condone the dualism at low
risks.
This dualism operated only at a practical level. Technically all lands,
especially registered lands, remained under one of the five registration
regimes referred to above. In practice, whenever ownership, possession
or other entitlement conflict arose, it was resolved according to this dualistic scheme. Generally for lands perceived to be governed by the
customary norms, those norms were closely respected despite the black
letter of the law. Conversely, for those lands perceived to be within the
modems category, legal rules governing registered lands were strictly
enforced. Aside from maintenance of this dualism, specific laws designed to concretize the dualism were enacted. In addition to the Tea and
Coffee Acts referred to above,'t° other notable laws that contributed to
maintenance of the dualism include the Agriculture Act,'0 ' the Land Control Act 0 2 and the Married Women's Property Act.' 3 Below, I refer to
both of these aspects of selective interpretation and enforcement and the
enactment and application of the laws as "legal chips" used to stabilize
or destabilize the dual system." 4
In those few cases when either category was challenged using norms
from the other (i.e., where traditional norms were used to challenge
ownership in the modern category or rigorous and legalistic registration
rules used to challenge or enforce ownership in the traditional category),
the courts generally thwarted such attempts. In the rare case, however, a
court decision threatened to upset this parallel system, such as the 1998
High Court Salama Holdings Case. In this case the High Court ruled that
an allocation of land to a private investor was null and void on public
policy grounds.'" This case raised a furor among business people because the person to whom the land had originally been issued had sold it
to a third party. The High Court ruled that since the allocation was void
in the first place, the third party, despite being a bonafide purchaser, had
no right of possession to the land. The third party could only sue the
seller for recovery of the sale price. In reaching its decision, the High
100.
See supra note 74.
101.
The Agriculture Act, Laws of Kenya Ch. 318 (rev. ed. 1986) (1980).
102.
The Land Consolidation Act, supra note 63.
103.
The Married Women's Property Act of 1882, supra note 78 is an English Act of
Parliament applicable in Kenya as a "statute of general application" pursuant to the Judicature
Act of Kenya. The Judicature Act, Laws of Kenya Ch. 8 (rev. ed. 1988) (1983) § 3(1).
104.
See Kennedy, supra note 87.
105.
Salama Holdings Case, HCCC No. 3798 of 1998, Msagha-Mbogholi, J.
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Court basically reduced the precise wording of the Registered Titles Act
to nothing. The Act stipulates:
A Certificate of Title issued by the Registrar to a purchaser of
land upon a transfer or transmission of land .... is to be taken
by the courts as conclusive evidence that the person named
therein as proprietor of the land is the absolute and indefeasible
owner thereof, subject only to the encumbrances, easements, restrictions and conditions contained therein and endorsed thereon
..[T]he title once issued would not be subject to challenge on
the ground of fraud or misrepresentation to which he was proved
to be party...'0'
By raising arguments about public policy, the Court erased the text
of the statute and instead created new rules.'0 7 However, this was a case
in which such a translation of the statutory text was de trop. The Court of
Appeal promptly overturned the case.
Similarly, when a litigant attempts to claim a right in the 'rural farmers' category based on a strictly textual understanding of statutory text,
she is likely to be met with forceful translationist arguments. Each system thrives on its own interpretation of rules. Yet both are governed
ostensibly, by the same statutes. The result is a somewhat stable system.
It is the possibility of upsetting this parallel system that many, including
the economic investors, are worried about when they speak of "tenure
insecurity" in Kenya, and not the existence of the parallel system itself.' 8
Why has this informal bifurcation arisen and how does it continue to
flourish? To answer this question, I first identify the reasons put forward
to support land registration in Kenya and elsewhere and contextualize
these reasons in the specific case of Kenya. We will then see how these
rationales were proved wrong on the ground in Kenya and how the legal
106.
Registered Land Act, supra note 53, § 24.
107.
Courts often refer to "immanent" rules of interpretation when they seek to "translate" the meaning of a statute beyond that which the plain text of the statute would seem to
permit. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
STAN. L. REV. 395, 443 (1995); Frank Michelman, A Brief Anatomy of Adjudicative RuleFormalism,66 U. CHI. L. REV. 934, 935 (1999).
108.
This is a universal fear of investors, not a product of the parallel system. Even
where no such dualism exists, there is always a fear that the rules may be rendered differently
in interpretation hence causing confusion. Rules are interpreted consistently, not because of
the natural qualities of the norms being interpreted, but because of the community of interpreters who thwart alternative interpretations. For a detailed discussion, see Section IX.
This interesting trend merits further attention because it modifies some of the very
widely held neo-classical teachings on the market and the impact of legal institutions on economic development. For a general discussion of agrarian development in Kenya and class
formation exists, see ROBERT BATES, BEYOND THE MIRACLE OF THE MARKET: THE ECONOMY
OF AGRARIAN DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA (1989). See also LEO, supra note 45.
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regime impacted social norms and institutions to produce this bifurcation.
VI.

THE RATIONALE FOR LAND REGISTRATION

Five different, but related reasons for why registration was a priority
in terms of economic development can be discerned from literature on
the subject."l
First, it is argued that the customary tenure system was communal
and therefore inefficient because it led to the tragedy of the commons.""
The communal customary system was associated with improper land use
because in this system, it was argued, different persons have the right to
use the land. Exercise of these rights by all the persons who possess
them creates interdependencies that remain outside the explicit calculus
of the choice makers. Since none of the rights-holders can exclude the
others, they impose external diseconomies on others who hold similar
rights. " ' This leads to overuse and inefficient use of the land. In making
this argument a presumption was made that traditional African customary systems were indeed communal."'
This argument is supplemented by the classical liberal argument for
private property as an "essential element for insulating the individual
from the intrusion of the State"" 3 and, in this case, the traditional society.
The argument is suffused with the efficiency perspective. Formal registration of title enhances security of tenure since it eschews fluidity in
tenure arrangements among native Kenyans. It was thought that registration of individual titles would remove uncertainty in ownership, thereby
reducing litigation and enhancing security.' '4 The basic assumption in
these arguments is that private and individual land holding would encourage native Kenyans to change their inefficient and irrational land
109.
See Swynnerton Plan, supra note 47; see also Byamugisha, supra note 5 (discussing the World Bank studies on the link between land registration and economic performance).
110.
Swynnerton Plan, supra note 47.
11.
This is the standard rendition of the tragedy of the commons. Hardin, supra note
11, at 1244-45. The Swynnerton Plan heavily relied on this and similar arguments to advocate
for a reform in the tenure holding system. Swynnerton Plan, supra note 47.
112.
This assumption has since been dispelled and falsified. See generally ANGELA
CHEATERS,

IDIOMS

OF ACCUMULATION:

RURAL

DEVELOPMENT

AND

CLASS

FORMATION

AMONG FREEHOLDERS IN ZIMBABWE (1984) (analysis of the socioeconomic structure of the
African freehold farmer and their role in agricultural production and development).
113.
Swynnerton Plan, supra note 47. Similar arguments have been made by liberal
approaches to property rights. E.g., CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES (1941).

114.
Instructively, the registration statutes precluded the possibility of challenging a first
registration even on grounds of fraud or mistake. See The Registered Land Act, supra note 53,
§ 143.
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utilization techniques. As van Meerhaeghe remarks, "further economic
growth calls for a change in mentality. The conservatism and illiteracy of
the agricultural population often prove an obstacle to any progress in that
sector.""' As I demonstrate below, however, the customary tenure arrangements were neither communal nor inefficient. ' 6 Further, the
argument that land registration would ensure security and less litigation
was not borne out in practice. This is due in part to the fact that the security land registration is thought to bring, does not follow from
registration per se but from a particular interpretation of rules related to
registration." 7
A third reason stated for land registration is the posited link between
land-ownership security and unit productivity. This argument assumes
that land registration enhances tenure security. Tenure security accruing
from land registration "removes uncertainty on whether or not landowners can reap the benefits of long term investments they make such as onfarm tertiary irrigation systems, drainage, soil and water conservation,
and construction of a rental house.""' The argument is that positive expectations about exclusive enjoyment of returns earned from investment
induces land owners to make land-based investments in agriculture and
non-agricultural investments. "9 The effect is increased demand for investment which in turn boosts demand for complementary inputs such as
labor and agricultural inputs including credit. 2 °
A related argument is that land registration of titles would produce
title documents for use as loan collateral for individual farmers, leading
to an increase in credit supply. Land registration facilitates more precise
identification of landowners, thus reducing moral hazards and adverse
selection in the credit market. This reduction of moral hazards and adverse selection leads to less transaction and information costs. These
reductions are passed on to the borrower and investor. Since economic
development involves moving resources from savers to investors, obtaining loans is simplified, hence contributing to economic development.
Loans taken using the titles as collateral could be used for further investment in the farm. Moreover, an increased demand for investment

115.
M.A.G VAN MEERHAEGHE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 153 (Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd. ed., 1964).
116.
See also Shem Migot-Adholla, Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan
Africa: A Constrainton Productivity?,5 WORLD BANK EcON. REv. 155 (1991); Nyamu, supra
note 56.
117.
See discussion supra Section nI.
118.
Byamugisha, supra note 5, at 5.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
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could cause an increase in labor and technology, a positive externality.'2 '
Security of tenure and easy alienability of land leads to the creation of a
dynamic land market. This land liquidity promotes efficiency by encouraging land to be sold to the person who values it most and encouraging
people to sell land they do not need since they would be able to easily
reenter the land market. In addition, registration of individual titles reduces transaction costs and information asymmetries making mutually
22
beneficial exchanges of property rights easier and more efficient.
Another land registration rationale involves land liquidity, deposit
mobilization and investment linkage. 3 The argument is that land registration transforms land into a liquid asset thereby unlocking the
resources embedded in it for use directly in investment or indirectly
through financial intermediaries. Registration enhances liquidation by
making the land securely and efficiently transferable through the land
market.' 24
Lastly, the link between labor mobility and efficiency is based on the
efficiency of redeploying labor released by the use of more efficient
technology on the land. The release of this labor results in more useful
and efficient contributions to other sectors of the economy.1
25

VII.

CONTEXTUALIZING THE RATIONALES

A. The Impetusfor Land Registrationand Titling
in the Pre-IndependencePeriod
One of the most acknowledged facts in Kenya's transition to independence is the centrality of land grievances in the Mau Mau war. 26 Less
acknowledged, however, is how land reform and choice of economic
policies were packaged so as to produce circumstances to blunt emerging radical African politics.'
121.
Id.; Gershon Feder & Akihiko Nishio, The Benefits of Land Registration and 1tling: Economic and Social Perspectives, 15 LAND USE POL'Y 25, 26-28 (1999).
Klaus Deininger & Gershon Feder, Land Institutions and Land Markets
122.
(World Bank Pol'y Res. Working Paper No. 2014, 1999), available at http://
Inweb I8.worldbank.org/ESSD/essdext.nsf/24DocByUnid/E765B7E36D] 6149085256
B990063A21A/$FILElandinstitutionsandmarkets.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
Byamugisha, supra note 5, at 10.
123.
Id.; see DE SOTO, supra note 3.
124.
See Byamugisha, supra note 5, at 11.
125.
126.
See Ghai & McAuslan, supra note 50; Maloba, supra note 50.
For compelling accounts of this aspect of the political and economic aspects leading
127.
to Kenya's independence, see MALOBA, supra note 70; H.W.O OKOTH-OGENDO, TENANTS OF
THE CROWN: EVOLUTION OF AGRARIAN LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN KENYA (1991); SORRENSON, supra note 48. However these aspects are typically ignored in popular discourse on
Kenya's history.
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The reserve policy 8 precipitated serious problems of landlessness,
especially in Kikuyu country and in the Kavirondo, that culminated in
the Mau Mau Revolt. 9 The restlessness was fuelled by the fact that land
shortage forced families to be more dependent on waged employment.
With time, flagrant social differentiation became evident in the rural areas as certain homesteads and communities were in a position to
accumulate more than others."3° The colonial economy of expansion of
settler production based on contraction of native production and increased restriction of the peasant economy was recipe for open revolt
from the masses.
The colonial response to the growing unrest was co-option. The
various policy strands were put together in a comprehensive government
policy document by the then Assistant Director of Agriculture, R. J. M.
Swynnerton. 3 ' The government policy culminated in The Swynnerton
Plan.' In the Swynnerton Plan, the problem facing African agriculture
was construed as the consequence of African land tenure system and not
land shortage caused by colonial expropriation. By eschewing the obvious causal relationship between the colonial occupation and the colonial
land policies to the problems facing African agriculture, and instead arguing that the basic problem was the indigenous tenure arrangements,
the colonialists were able to recommend modernization and reform to
remove the constraints supposedly posed by the African tenure arrangements. Unsurprisingly the Swynnerton Plan proposed individualization
of tenure among the Africans as the panacea:
Sound agricultural development is dependent upon a system of
land tenure which will make available to the African farmer a
unit of land and a system of farming whose production will
128.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
129.
Kikuyu country is in today's Kenya central province in the areas around Mt. Kenya.
Kavirondo refers to the areas traditionally occupied by the Luo ethnic group, especially the
area around Lake Victoria in Nyanza province. See DAVID MAUGHAN-BROWN, LAND, FREEDOM AND FICTION (1985), for a standard account of Mau Mau Movement and the centrality of
land in the struggle. Both Maloba and Leo have good accounts of the Mau Mau war and political and economic events that shaped the war and the independent Kenya. See MALOBA,
supra note 70; LEO, supra note 45.
130.
See GAVIN KITCHING, CLASS AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN KENYA: THE MAKING OF
AN AFRICAN PETITE-BOURGEOISIE 1905-1970 55-56 (1980). By making this point, I do not
claim African societies were egalitarian. Rather, I imply that the indigenous systems/norms in
place in pre-colonial times that facilitated a balance through inter-generational transfers and
kinship ties had been removed by the colonial incursion. Therefore, differentiation was not
only exacerbated but also became more visible. Robert Bates has convincingly made this argument. See Bates, supra note 108, at 31.
131.
Land Utilization and Settlement: A Statement of Government Policy (Colony and
Protectorate of Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 8, 1945).
132.
Swynnerton Plan, supra note 47.
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support his family ... He must be provided with such security of
tenure through an indefeasible title as will encourage him to
invest his labour and profits into the development of his farm
and as will enable him to offer it as security against such
financial credits as he may wish to secure..."
However, the real aim of the Swynnerton Plan was not to individualize land but to create landed African gentry that would participate more
soundly in intensive and large-scale agriculture thereby creating a stable
and conservative middle class to provide a bulwark against nationalism
and the radical policies assumed to accompany it. M1 By arguing that progress was conditional upon tenure reform, the Swynnerton Plan merely
affirmed that time was ripe for major reorganizations in the political
economy of colonialism.'35 This explains why the leitmotif of the Swynnerton Plan was tenure reform rather than land reform.3 6 Such a
construction justified the reforms to the African peasantry while maintaining the pattern of land distribution. Three facts demonstrate this
point. First, the Swynnerton Plan only targeted peasants within the Mau
Mau districts. 3 7 Second, even there, it was directed at a select group of
educated, "progressive" farmers already engaged in the production of
settler crops the emerging local elite.' Third, the colonial government
targeted and seized land belonging to individuals involved with the independence struggle and placed it in the pool of common land to be
redistributed. 139 To this extent, individualization of tenure was a political
tool that came in handy to blunt Kenyans' demand for land redistribution."
It ought to be borne in mind that this time period was the decolonization era in international law."'1 While it was clear to the colonialists
that they had to leave Kenya, it was imperative that to carry out decolonization in such a way that the established colonial economic and social
systems were neither disturbed nor altered. The overriding aim was to
retain the economic basis of colonialism. 142 For this strategy to come to
133.
134.

Id. at 9.
M.P.K. SORRENSON, LAND REFORM IN THE KIKUYU COUNTRY 118 (1967).
135.
OKOTH-OGENDO, supra note 127, at 71.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
MALOBA, supra note 70, at 144.
140.
Id.
141.
Declarationon the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A.Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
142.
Maloba, supra note 50, at 197. The then Governor of Kenya is reported to have
commented that the British Empire "is not breaking up, but growing up." A resolution on the
grant of new constitutions to colonial territories stated "the increased volume of inter-imperial
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fruition, it was necessary for colonialists to place power in the hands of
the collaborating emerging local elite whose stake in the status quo
would safeguard the link between the former colony and the imperial
power by espousing conservative economic and social policies. First, the
conservative elite had to be created; this was the function of the tenure
reforms of the 1950s.
The effect of the tenure reforms was the creation of a class of conservative nationalists who, though eager for political independence, were
not inclined to support radical policies or politics. This way the problem
of the Mau Mau uprising was skillfully navigated and the stage set for
cautious conservative politiCS.' The colonialists had succeeded in their
primary approach to systematically diffuse political nationalism by creating a social class within the African ranks with similar interests,
aspirations and ideals as those of the ruling colonial elite.
Thus, it is clear that the real objective of the registration exercise in
Kenya at the height of the Mau Mau revolt was massive social reorganization. However, various government policy papers, including the loan
justifications to the World Bank, justified the land registration exercise in
economic terms. These two positions are not mutually exclusive, but mutually reinforcing. The idea was to create a landed African petty
bourgeois to serve the capitalist economic development path envisaged
while politically blunting radical African political claims.
B. The Impetus for Registration and Titling
in the Post-IndependencePeriod
A more difficult question is why the independent Kenyan government accepted land registration on the same terms. I attempt three
responses. The first relates to the theme of social re-organization but is
less stark-at least in rhetoric. The independent government was interested in economic development, defined in terms of modernization and
industrialization.'" To bring about this development, both conservative
and radical wisdom held it was necessary to capture the peasants to promote meaningful peasant contribution to the economy. This need was
brought about by the fact that the peasants straddle two economies-a
consumption economy and a cash economy-in a way that defies the

trade resulting from an expanding commonwealth would assist in solving economic problems." Self-rule in Colonies the Only Way, E. AFR. STANDARD, Oct. 13, 1956, at 1.
143.
OKOTH-OGENDA, supra note 127, at 69-77.
144.
See Robert Bates, Some Conventional Orthodoxies in the Study of Agrarian
Change, 36 WORLD POL. 234 (1984).
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dictates of both. 4 5 By straddling two economies, peasants are able to obtain a measure of security and freedom from the both market and the
government. This is exceedingly frustrating for any government whose
prime objective is modernization. Since the peasants have an acerbic
ambivalence toward the market, it is foolish to expect them to obey the
market's laws-and often they do not.'46 It was therefore the government's goal to force peasants into a position where they must obey both
market and government dictates.
Second, the independence bargain in Kenya was supported by departing colonialists and the national elites. Departing colonists supported
the land registration bargain because they wanted full compensation
from the government for their large parcels if they chose the exit option
at the time of independence. The national elite lent their support because
they were quickly buying off the large tracts of land being sold by departing settlers.
A third factor was the paradoxical pressure for the land registration
bargain from peasants and other small holder agriculturists who wanted
to guarantee their parcels against feared governmental confiscation in the
future. Most of these peasants had lived during the time when the colonial government had grabbed their former lands and wanted assurance
that the new government would not have an opportunity to do the same.
VIII.

EXPLAINING THE BIFURCATION

A. InstitutionalFramework
As hinted in Section III above, land registration did not actually
usher in all the envisaged changes: there was no major social reorganization, no spectacular break-up of the traditional African family,
and no British-revolution-style enclosures and sales among the small
scale holders of land. 147 Why did the radical new registration regimes not,
in fact, cause the envisaged massive social re-organization and re-

145.
The terminology and thoughts of "capturing the peasant" are borrowed from Christopher Leo. LEO, supra note 45, at 19. The metaphor of peasants straddling two economies is
originally from Cowen, supra note 91.
146.
There is need to clarify an often confusing theme here. Stating that peasants are
ambivalent toward the market and cannot always be counted on to obey its laws differs from
doubting that peasants are rational economic actors. It affirms the fact, which may seem irrational, that, from the peasant's position, it is at times more rational for them to make decisions
from a purely neo-classical view. For examples of such situations see Robert Bates & Amy
Farmer, Community Versus Market: A Note on CorporateVillages, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 457

(1992).
147.

See Kang'ara, supra note 33.

Winter 2004]

Re-Examining the Role of Private Property

structuring? The answers to this question explain the bifurcation of the
property system at the practical level.
One of the two lessons Robert Bates drew from his study of agrarian
development in Kenya is that politics matter in determining the degree to
which efficient outcomes are attainable.' 41 Politics create the conditions
conducive for parties to bargain and reach efficient and mutually beneficial outcomes. However, this study of land registration in Kenya
confirms that the formal system of property supplies only one part of
institutions that shape the conditions to facilitate attainment of these mutually beneficial agreements. The success of the system of property
rights established in Kenya depended on the way other social norms
would impact formalized norms. On the other hand, this impact depended on how the different actors organized and deployed the
appropriated social norms.
The actual experience of land registration in Kenya bears out Bates'
conclusion in a particular sense. It shows the inefficacy of relying on
formal rules as the only determinant of how a market is established and
maintained. It emphasizes the importance of recognizing formal legal
rules as only one of many social institutions that determine economic
performance. In Kenya, massive and elaborate social norms prevented an
immediate emergence of a land market that would have spurred on the
emergence of a new social order.
Second, Bates concluded that in a world of positive transaction
costs, political institutions supply the incentives that lead to the organization of interests. 149 They thereby help determine which economic
interests become politically effective interests. This would explain why,
despite a formal title registration for almost all land in Kenya, effective
support for the existence of parallel customary norms regulating specific
aspects of land use and access remains.'50 The stark legal land registration regime in Kenya was balanced by a judiciary willing to use various
legal devises to temper the excesses of the system.

BATES, supra note 108.
Id.
149.
150.
By referring to "customary norms" I do not claim there are precise ways of establishing norms which represent a certain culture. I agree with Nicholas Dirks that through
social practices, people in society are constantly negotiating questions of power, authority and
the control of the definitions of reality. See Nicholas Dirks, Introduction to CUL-

148.

TURE/POwER/HISTORY: A READER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 4 (Nicholas Dirks et al

eds., 1993). This is as true of cultural norms as it is true of the interpretations of legal norms,
including the merely technical issues. See Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the
Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law 1985 Wis. L. REv. 565 (1985); Duncan
Kennedy, The PoliticalStakes in "Merely Technical" Issues of Contract Law, 10 EUR. REV.
PRIVATE L. 7 (2002).
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B. Legal Chips as Stabilizing or DestabilizingFactors

The parallel system enabled security of tenure by selective use and
disuse of legal and social norms to maintain and tolerate particular property rights. Among peasants, though land was formally registered under
one of the five registration regimes mentioned above, in practice, other
forms of social and traditional claims and control were accepted and tolerated notwithstanding the very precise and total rights bequeathed by
formal registration. What is more is that, to a large extent, these forms of
traditional claims and control were given the force of law, notably by
judicial interpretation of the various registration statutes. Thus, whenever
a landowner tried to use registration to shut out other traditional claims,
both societal sanctions and legal hurdles were sprung on his path.
Various persons legally and successfully used the following seven
techniques to freeze attempts by persons to break free of such societal
control of land. Courts and other administrative agencies used these
means to uphold customary norms related to land-ownership at the expense of the rights imbued by the legal titles under the registration
statutes.
1. The Enactment and Implementation of the Land Control Act
Though the land registration regimes arguably provide for the whole
cluster of rights that Honor6 described in his paradigm case,'5 the Land
Control Act'52 was enacted for the singular purpose of restricting and
controlling the right to freely alienate land in agricultural areas. The preamble states that the Act is "[a]n Act of Parliament to control the53 transfer
of Land in certain areas and for purposes connected therewith."'
The Act creates a Land Control Board at the local (village) level that
is meant to vet all land transfers. The law permits the Land Control
Board to deny approval to transfers that in some way trammel customary
law by being substantively "unjust". In practice, however, the Land Control Board distinguished between the two categories of land, accepting a
faithful interpretation of the registration regimes to one and a translationist interpretation of the registration statutes to the other. Thus, the Land
Control Boards were able to act within their statutory mandate yet main151.

A.M. Honord, Ownership, in OXFORD

ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: A COLLABORA107-26 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (specifying the incidents that constitute the bundle
of rights of ownership of land as: 1) the right to possess; 2) the right to use; 3) the right to
manage; 4) the right to the income; 5) the right to the capital; 6) the right to security (immunity from expropriation); 7) the power of transmissibility; 8) the incident of absence of term;
9) the prohibition of harmful use; 10) liability to execution; and, 11) the residual rights on the
reversion of lapsed ownership rights held by others.
152.
The Land Control Act, supra note 63.
153.
Id. pmbl.
TIVE WORK
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tain the dual system of land-holding depending on the category of land
in question.
As Okoth-Ogendo explains, the theory of land control in the smallfarm areas was initially social. Specifically, the state had a duty to prevent the improvident from exercising their rights to their own
detriment. 14 However, the rationale for land control throughout the
whole country has become more political and economic than social.
Okoth-Ogendo states two ways in which the Land Control Boards exercised their discretion to deny approval for land sale transactions:
(1) where family members have not approved the transaction be it a sale,
transfer or a subdivision; and (2) where the vendor cannot adequately
demonstrate alternative means of subsistence for his or her family in the
event the property in question is sold or subdivided. 5
Given these two operational observations, the Land Control Board
exhibited some form of paternalism toward the seller by ensuring that a
landowner only sold land after rational calculation of his interests and
those of his family. This kind of regulation was borne out of the state's
recognition that an individual landowner's actions had repercussions beyond that individual. Through the Land Control Boards, the state sought
to establish public rights in the private property.
One could also view the Land Control Board as an efficiencyenhancing regulatory board. Rather than give each person with an interest in a parcel of land the right to exclude by formal registration, the
statute aimed to eschew the problem of inefficient under use by giving
legal rights to only one person. However, discretionary power was
granted to Land Control Boards to enforce the equitable unregistered
rights of the "equitable" owners at their behest. In exercising their discretion, the Land Control Board could then address economic and other
policy issues and appropriately address the problem of the anticommons.
On the other hand, empirical studies have shown that attitudes regarding charges and mortgages represent a different set of values. In
almost every occasion consent to charge or mortgage property or to act
as a guarantor was granted.'5 6 This was due to the fact that most Land
Control Board members, as government appointees or members of the
elite and educated middle class, accepted the state favored economic argument that the flow of credit to agriculture or commercial enterprises
was beneficial and should be encouraged. Since most property owners
154.
H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, African Land Tenure Reform, in AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 152, 172-74 (J. Heyer et al eds., 1976).
155.
156.

Id. at 174.
Id.
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seeking credits tended to be members of the educated, elite middle class,
it follows that this dynamic at the Land Control Board merely entrenched the dual system.
2. The Enactment and Implementation of Land
(Group Representatives) Law
The Land (Group Representatives) Act provided for incorporation of
representatives of groups who have been recorded as landowners under
the Land Adjudication Act.'57 Under the provisions of this Act, the land
may be registered in the names of group representatives after incorporation."'
This legislation did not introduce a new registration system but was
meant to enable certain ethnic groups in Kenya-primarily the Maasai,
Samburu, and Somali-to register their land and hence reap the fruits of
registration without fundamentally changing the customary ways of
holding land.
This Act exemplifies land reform that is respectful of community
values dear to certain ethnic groups. 5 9 It applied in most semi-arid parts
of the country and permitted individuals to incorporate themselves into a
group, elect group representatives who are then registered as the owners
of the land jointly owned by the group as a whole. The land jointly
owned by the group is then used by all group members under the direction of the group representatives, presumably as governed by the
customary norms of the group.' 6 Therefore, the use, sale, transfer, mortgage or any other transaction of the land or any part thereof, is, for
practical purposes, subject to the customary norms of the groupalthough technically the land is registered in the name of the group representatives as trustees for the group.161
3.The Enactment and Implementation of Legislation
Regulating Agricultural Exports
Another factor that frustrated the emergence of a vibrant land market
was the significant presence of international capital that stood to gain by
a flourishing peasant economy. The independent government was eager
157.
The Land (Group Representatives) Act, supra note 74.
158.
Id. §§ 5, 6,7 and 8.
159.
See Joel Ngugi, The Decolonization-Modernization Interface and the Plight of
Indigenous Peoples in Post-ColonialDevelopment Discourse in Africa, 20 Wisc. J. INT'L. L. J.
297 (2002).
160.
The Land (Group Representatives) Act, supra note 74, § 18.
161.
For some of the problems associated with this system, see Ngugi, supra note 159, at
329; Xavier Pdron, Land Privatizationand Public Appropriation of Land Among the Maasai
in Kenya: A Status of Double Deprivation (Fr. Inst. for Res. in Afr., Working Paper No. 22,

1995).
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to control the agricultural export industry for two reasons. First, control
of the industry would allow the government to more easily harness an
agriculture industry surplus for purposes of re-investment in accordance
with the import substituting industrialization policies. 6 2 This was because the government regulated the sale of export crops to more easily
levy taxes on the farmers. Second, regulation of the planting, cultivation,
processing and sale of export crops allowed the government to assure
foreign agro-industry investors of continued business, profits, supplies,
and quality of produce. Thus, international capital present in Kenya with
a stake in agro-industry strongly supported individualization of tenure to
the extent that it meant that individual farmers would put their parcels of
land under export crops, which would, in turn, lead to increased supplies
of export crops produce. Hence, a somewhat unwitting alliance between
international capital and the peasants growing export crops arose.
This alliance, by its operation, frustrated the emergence of a potential local bourgeoisie and thus the emergence of a land market in two
ways. First, specific restrictions on sale and use of land intended to ensure return of investment by international capital were written into law.
These were mainly restrictions in the form of laws regulating agricultural industries, production, marketing and export of major agricultural
exports such as coconut, coffee, cotton, pyrethrum, tea, and sisal. These
crops without a license from a
included laws prohibiting the planting 6of
3
board.
appropriate
the
or
state minister
The converse of these prohibitions had the real bite. These statutory
provisions stipulated that the responsible minister or board may grant or
deny application to plant any of these export crops, and in granting may
impose such conditions as they fit. One condition commonly imposed
has been a restriction on the power of the landowner or the license
grantee to uproot any crop or cease cultivation of a particular crop.' 64 As
a result of these laws, the rights of an individual landowner cultivating of
any of these crops to use the land as he or she pleases were seriously
curtailed. At the same time, however, these regulations benefited international capital by statutorily ensuring supplies and quality of produce for
processing and export.
162.
Ngugi, supra note 159, at 345.
163.
The Coconut Industry Act, Laws of Kenya Ch. 331 (rev. ed. 1983) (1962) § 8; The
Coffee Act, supra note 75, §§ 17, 38(g); The Coffee (Cultivation and Processing) Rules, supra
note 99, § 3(1); The Cotton Act, supra note 99, § 41; The Pyrethrum Act, supra note 99, §12;
The Sisal Act, supra note 99, §§ 13(a), 14; The Tea Act, supra note 75, § 8. Most of these
provisions empowered the minister to, inter alia, delineate the areas in which the crops may
be planted, as well as regulate and control the varieties, cultural conditions, method of production, quality of the produce, and control of pests and diseases.
164.
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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4. The Discovery and Operationalization of the
"African Trust" Doctrine by Judges
In cases where a person is registered as a sole proprietor of land but
only registered as such because the other family members acquiesced to
registration or were ignorant about its effects, the courts have been willing to construct a trust doctrine which operates to deny the person the
rights of a sole proprietor. Courts have declared that the registered owner
holds the whole or part of the land for a person entitled to the land under
customary law and subsequently ordered the land to be transferred to
such person. A classic example of use of the African trust doctrine as a
remedy for injustice caused by the adjudication of land is Alan Kiama v.
Ndia Muthunya & Others.'65 In this case, a clan agreed, in 1959, to register a 47-acre plot of clan land in the name of one clan member. The
agreement was that the land would later be subdivided into individual
holdings for each family head in the clan. Although the clan members
lived on the plot, the registered landowner technically remained the absolute landowner. In 1972, the registered landowner decided to exchange
the land for a fifteen acre plot. The new owner brought suit for ejectment
of the clan members. The High Court ruled in favor of the clan holding
that the registered owner had held the land in trust for the clan members.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision holding that a "resulting trust arose out of the relationship of the parties" and "the
circumstances of the case."' 66
S.F.R. Coldman aptly summarized the implication of this trust doctrine:
Whatever the legal merits of this decision, its social and economic implications could be far reaching. If the appeal had been
allowed [i.e. if the court had not implied a trust in operation],
large numbers of people would have been rendered landless ...
On the other hand, it should be remembered that one of the purposes of the land registration program was to create a land
market and to enable the better farmers to acquire land even at
the cost of making others landless. The effect of the ["discovery"
165.
CAK [Court of Appeal of Kenya] C.A. No. 42 of 1978 (as yet unreported).
166.
Under English law, a voluntary conveyance of land into the name of another will
result in a trust for the grantor, at least where there is evidence of such intention of the parties.
Hodgson v. Marks & another, 2 All E.R. 684 (1971). A Kenyan case confirming the "trust"
device is Muthuita & another v. Wanoe & others, [1982] LLR 41 (CAK), No. 12/82. However,
this line of thought is balanced by another case holding that once the title of the land owner is
registered, the land ceases to be subject to customary law and is governed instead by a complete code of substantive law under the Registered Land Act, and that customary rights of
occupation or use are not overriding interests under that statute. See Esiroyo v. Esiroyo, [1973]
E. Afr. L. Rep. 388.
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of the trust doctrine] is that whenever a person is registered as
the absolute owner of land but on the understanding that other
persons (usually family members) are to retain a beneficial interest in the land, their rights will not be overridden on any
dealing with the land so long as they are in actual occupation or
possession, and sales, leases, mortgages of the land will therefore become virtually impossible, unless all such persons concur.
Registered conveyancing, far from being safe and simple, becomes dangerous and complex, and the courts, in attempting to
discover and give effects to the understandings on which persons
are registered as owners, are effectively re-adjudicating land
rights. 67
5. The Enactment of Specific "Safety Valve" Laws
to Regulate Statutory Sales and Foreclosures
A judicial willingness to curtail the statutory powers of sale of chargees or mortgagees where courts felt that permitting such sale would
violate commonly held notions of justice or fairness emerged at this
time. In doing this, the courts created a number of jurisprudential devices
of which the following list is only representative:
68
0 A strict adherence to the doctrine of notice;

167.
S.F.R. Coldham, Case Note, Alan Kiama v. Ndia Mathunya and Others, C.A. No.
42 of 1978 (as yet unreported), 1983 J. AFR. L. 62, 64 (1983).
This operates by placing undue burden of proving notice on the mortgagee or char168.
gee. For example, the chargee or mortgagee must prove not only that they served the notice
effectively (for example, not by regular mail), but also that the notice clearly stated the number of days in which the chargor or mortgagor must redeem the property. See, e.g., Trust Bank
Ltd. v. Kotedia, [2000] LLR 2382 (CAK), No. 61/00. In Ochieng & another v. Ochieng &
others, the court required production of proof of posting to sufficiently discharge the burden of
proving service of notice. Ochieng & another v. Ochieng & others, [1995] LLR 393 (CAK),
No. 148/95. Four years later the same court distinguished posting "under certificate of posting" from "registered post" and held that a notice served through the former avenue was not
validly served. See Trust Bank Ltd. v. Kotedia, supra. More stringently, in Okoth v. Trust Bank
Ltd., an injunction was issued against the exercise of the statutory power of sale on the sole
ground that the letter of notice stated that payment was due within fourteen days of the date of
the notice, while under the statute a notice of three months was required. Okoth v. Trust Bank
Ltd., [1997] LLR 87 (CCK), No. 1135/97. This was notwithstanding the fact that, in fact, three
months had already elapsed since the serving of the notice. The court insisted that the statute
must be interpreted strictly as requiring the notice to state that the sale will only become exercisable three months after service of notice. Id. On appeal the Court of Appeal of Kenya
affirmed the decision requiring the three month notice period be stated explicitly on the statutory notice, adding that that the three month period must commence at the date of service, not
on the date of the notice. Trust Bank Ltd. v. Okoth, [1998] LLR 1270 (CAK), No. 177/98.
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*

Invalidation of statutory sale where other options or remedies
to return the charged or mortgaged amount are available to
the chargee or mortgagee;'69

"

Affording allegations of fraud by the chargor or mortgagor or
a dispute as to the amount of debt as grounds for invalidating
or stopping a statutory sale; 70

*

Stopping statutory sales on grounds of unconscionable inter7
1
ests on the loaned amount;

Charles Kanjama poignantly and accurately captured the conflicted
judicial position on whether and when to enforce the statutory power of
sale:
The Court of Appeal has harkened to its notion of justice with
consummate flair, in turn dodging or bulldozing through precedents when these fail to serve its contemporary feelings of
fairness. One would think that sections 74 and 77 of the Registered Land Act and sections 69, 69A and 69B of the Transfer of
Property Act were fairly clear on the nature of the statutory
power of sale, statutory notice and the remedies to an aggrieved
party. Yet wading through two labyrinthine decades of the
Court's judgments is as fruitful as trying to scrutinize the ageless
face of the Sphinx.
The discreditable practice of borrowers refusing to heed repeated notices to repay yet frustrating the realization of
securities offered to chargees by obtaining
ex parte injunctions
72
has reached endemic proportions. 1

169.
See Nat'l Bank of Kenya v. Mwithukia [1998] LLR 130 (CCK), No. 223/98; Trust
Bank Ltd. v. Kotedia, [1997] LLR 87 (CCK).
170.
See Russell Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Bank of Africa Ltd., [1985] LLR 1415 (CAK),
No. 31/85; Mbuthia v. Jimba Credit Fin. Corp. & another, [1986] LLR 3292 (CAK), No.
111/86. In lhenya v. Barclays Bank, the court restrained a chargor from exercising the statutory power of sale effectively on the basis of a dispute as to the amount under the charge,
arguing that should the substantive suit determine the chargor had cleared the debt, a prior sale
of his property would have resulted in an irreparable loss. Ihenya Agencies v. Barclays Bank
of Kenya Ltd. & others, [1997] LLR 507 (CAK), No. 3/97.
171.
See Pipe Plastic Samkolit (K) Ltd. v. Nat'l Bank of Kenya Ltd., [1996] LLR 62
(CCK), No. 1078/96.
172.
Charles Kanjama, The Baffling Statutory Power of Sale, available at
http://www.lawafrica.com/HOTB/hotb2.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
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6. The Operationalization of the Married Women's
Property Act of 1882 to Regulate Statutory Sales
In cases where a person is registered as a sole proprietor and then he
deals with the land without the knowledge of his wife, the courts have
been willing to nullify such dealings on the ground that the land was
jointly owned by husband and wife and that the husband's dealings were
fraudulent and therefore void ab initio. In the Grace Muchiru Case,'73 the
property in dispute had been registered in the name of the husband, but
had been purchased during the subsistence of the marriage. The husband
subsequently mortgaged the property. When he defaulted in payments,
the mortgagee sought to realize the security by statutory sale. The wife
filed suit seeking an injunction on the grounds that she was a co-owner
of the property, that she had not consented to the mortgage transaction,
and that therefore the same was void ab initio for fraud. The High Court
held that since the property was acquired during the subsistence of the
marriage, despite the fact that it was registered in the sole name of the
husband, and no trust was registered under Section 126 of the Registered
Land Act, the plaintiff may prove to be a co-owner by evidence.'74 Such
evidence may be given under the Married Women's Property Act of
1882.17' The court therefore issued an injunction to stop the sale of the
property by the mortgagee.
The implication of this case and other similar cases, is that the efforts of financial institutions to realize security in cases of default of
payment of mortgages where wives who had not originally consented to
the transaction are curtailed when such wives challenge the sale. This
means that a husband registered as a sole owner of property requires
spousal consent to mortgage or charge the property, hence curtailing the
otherwise absolute powers of the registered owner as provided in the
statute.
Both legal and cultural chips are used by various stakeholders to
maintain a stable property system in Kenya among peasants, especially
in rural land mainly occupied by peasants and other small holders. On
the other hand, land owned by large-scale farmers, absentee farmers or
members of the landed national elites, different chips are played to stabilize the property system. Here, legal techniques are used to maintain the
system. There is an almost fanatical adherence to the freedom of the sole
registered owner. People dealing with such lands are constantly aware
that they are dealing with titled property and that their rights are stipulated or limited by the particular land regime under which it is registered.
173.
174.
175.

Grace Muchiru v. Simon Muchiru, HCCC No. 290 of 1998, Kasanga Mulwa, J.
Id.
See supra note 103.
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There are no strong societal values or expectations driving the decisionmaking as far as these lands are concerned. In the few cases brought to
challenge ownership of such lands using moral, traditional or cultural
templates as their basis for the challenge, legal chips and legalistic interpretations of the law were deployed to frustrate such claims. To this
extent, registered titles to lands are seen as sacrosanct, secure and impossible to impeach even by the government. Such cases have been mainly
in the high valued urban lands especially in and around Nairobi and in
cases government land grants.
Thus, for this category of lands, security of tenure is assured by resort to legal chips and an obsequious enforcement of the land registration
regime by the state. The property system and tenure security is assured
by the formal registration regime and judicial interpretation of its laws.
7. Cultural Chips as Stabilizing or Destabilizing Factors
What was most effective in this regard was the selective disuse of legal rights necessary to establish the social order envisaged by the
registration regime. Persons formally registered as sole proprietors of
land were reluctant to use their legal powers to evict their kith and kindred settled on the land. Forced evictions by persons registered as the
sole owner of a plot of land were met with threats of violence from the
rest of the villagers.
Lastly, insistence on sole ownership despite recognized traditional
claims of right to use or own part of the land was accompanied by the
fear of social ostracization. As demonstrated by Robert Bates, the need
to be socially accepted is a powerful incentive for most people in African
societies to organize their economic activities. Bates also found that this
is a useful trend economically and should be welcomed rather than discouraged as it enables inter-generational transfers. It is thus not possible
in the large majority of cases for a person to violate traditional norms
and run off to live in the city. In any event, it would be impossible to get
a buyer for land sold as a consequence of what would be perceived to be
putrescent moral norms of the seller who has kicked out his siblings or
family using what would surely be perceived to be unfair means.
As a result, an elaborate system of tenure evolved where both systems existed side by side. If there were any obstacles to development, it
was not due to fears of impeachment of one's rights to the land. Indeed,
the first time that such fears emerged, it was not due to fear of the fluidity of tenure caused by the parallel system, or by socially acceptable
means but by use of sheer violence.'76
This was during the politically instigated land clashes in Kenya that preceded the
176.
advent of multi-party politics in Kenya around 1992.
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IX. THE

WORLD BANK AND LAND REGISTRATION IN KENYA

The foregoing analysis shows that in the peculiar case of Kenya,
formalization of title through land registration regimes neither enhanced
nor eroded security of tenure in parts of Kenya. Therefore, the argument
that formalization of title, as insisted by the government, the World Bank
and other development agencies, is partly incorrect. As shown above,
none of the reasons given as necessitating formal land registration in the
particular sense in which it was carried out has been borne out by the
actual experience. In this section, I analyze the principal reasons for the
insistence of registration of land in development orthodoxy.
A. Land Registrationand Changing Relational Realities

From what I have described above, I see many ways in which the
land registration process reshaped relational realities in the Kenyan society.
First, the property regime was being used to create a new form of
societal relationships and organizations rather than attempt to reflect the
existing one. By insisting on individual ownership in terms of exclusivity
of ownership and use and a clear definition of ownership, the property
regime was used to deny relational realities that existed. At the same
time it attempted to forge new relational realities. To serve this purpose
well, the "non-appropriation" justification provided good technical and
intellectual rationale. But in crafting this regime, I see the instrumental
rationality argument clearly: attempts at under-socializing the human
being/transactions; hoping that removing her from the social context
would help 'equilibrate' her actions only through the price mechanism.
In Kenya, as far as land was concerned, this was not to be.
Second, the initial allegation that indigenous tenure systems constitute a disincentive to investment has been proved to be largely
unfounded. Hence, there has been no correlation between increased investment and land registration.' 7 For example, studies have shown that
there is no higher incidence of registration in commercialized areaswhich would be expected if there was any relationship between formal
titling and investment. 78 As I have already noted, formal titling did not
necessarily lead to less litigation and tenure insecurity. Despite the expensive adjudication process, and the statutory stipulation in the law that
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first registrations would not be challenged in courts,'79 litigants have
found novel ways to bring litigation to challenge first registrations. Further, studies have shown that there is no relationship between formal
titling and access to credit.' 8 Most credit demand among small-holders
relates to short-term production credit for which crop is generally accepted as security.'"' Thus, the tenure/collateral argument is largely false.
Also, as an empirical matter, the supply of credit, particularly for small
holders, has not expanded as a result of titling.
A slow growth of land markets restricts the possibility and efficacy
of foreclosures and undermines the tenure/collateral argument. As demonstrated above, the forms and terms of land transfer, including sales, are
determined by economic, social and cultural factors. These factors are
not altered by administrative fiat through titling. 2
Third, the process of formalization of title aimed to create a social
dynamic that would separate the political from the economic in property
relations. This way, it would be easier to make the move of distinguishing the public from the private. In other words, formalization of title
would help break the "social embeddedness" and hence formally separate the economic from the political. This way, it would be possible to
redefine demands for land in purely economic terms and without any
attendant consequences on the political.
Therefore, by fragmenting economic demand for land from the political foundation, it became possible to transform the African demands
for land from being political (and public) to being economic (and private). This way, the economic demands for land would now be handled
in the private sphere through purchases, leases, and similar devices without political repercussions. By merely changing the architecture of
property, it was possible to simultaneously transform a political and public grievance into an economic and private affair to be addressed in the
marketplace and attempt the transformation of social relations.
The emergence of formally rational law is viewed by some as necessary for the emergence of formal justice, composed of strict procedures
that result in the differentiation of legal and political dimensions of society.'83 The greatest advantage of this in the Weberian typology is that the
"formal justice" through "the use of legal reasoning applied through
179.
The Land Registration Act forbids challenging first registration of land even on
grounds of fraud. Land Registration Act, supra note 53, § 143.
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Migot-Adholla, supra note 116; Frank Place & Shem E. Migot-Adholla, The Economic Effect of Land Registration on Small-holder Farms in Kenya: Evidence from Nyeri and
Kakamega Districts,74 LAND EcoN. 360-73 (1998).
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logical procedures to the facts of the case""' fosters capitalist development by its general effect of predictability that a formal system provides.
Both these aspects of "formal rational law" as evidenced by title are further elaboration of ideology. The mode of reasoning parallels that of
typical law and modernization theory. It sees modem law as a prerequisite to economic development-and assumes it is central to the creation
and maintenance of a market economy.
This whole logic rests upon the assumption that the relationship between law and economic development is a universal, reproducible and
invariable relationship.' 5 This is because, it is argued, the predictability
that modem law supplies naturally encourages the growth of capitalism
by increasing economic confidence within the society. This results in
long term investments rather than short-term speculations, hence stimulating and stabilizing the market.1 6Translated into political realities, this
logic counsels the necessity of programs to introduce a specific system
of laws that are extrapolated to react in the unstable and undeveloped
traditional society to cause a shift in its economic and political structures.
The argument is faulty on at least three counts. First, it exaggerates
the degree of predictability that is obtainable under a system of formal
institutions. The assumption is that the "rational" system of formal laws
leads to predictable outcomes. However, this aspect of "predictability"
falls prey to the realist critique of the formal classical system of rules.
The impression of predictability and administrative convenience is illusory.'8 7 The realist critics have long shown that the "rational" system is as
manipulable and dependent on contextual variability as an informal customary system would be. The apparent stability and "predictability" of
the system is mainly due to "well-accepted conventions within the community of regular interpreters of the 'system"" 88 not to the natural
capacity of the formal norms to be stable. Seen this way, it is then possible to argue that it is always open for parties with a stake in upsetting the
conventional interpretations of particular norms/rules/formal institutions
to throw out new arguments that would necessitate reinterpretation of the
rule.
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Id. at 72.
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Jean Wu, Overseas Chinese Capitalismand the Marginalizationof the Rule of Law:
A Reassessment of the Relationship Between Law and Economic Development, 4 BERKELEY
McNAIR J. (1996), at http://www-mcnair.berkeley.edu/96journal/wu.html (last visited Apr. 8,
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In such circumstances, then, for the conventional interpretation to
adhere, one is forced to make a choice that is informed less by the nature
of the rule/institution itself and more on the policy desirability of the
interpretation. When it becomes clear that several different plausible interpretations to the same formal rule/institution are possible, it becomes
more difficult to interpret one as more efficient because the efficiency
argument is pitched on the stability of the institution itself which, in turn,
contingent upon stability of interpretation of other questions related to it.
In this regard, the only way one can justify the particular interpretation
as efficient is by accepting the set of other interpretations of linked questions that stabilize that interpretation. If one chose to accord a different
interpretation, then one opens up the possibility of the existence of
multi-equilibria from which it is not possible to make an efficiency argument.
At best, this suggests that there is the possibility of the existence of
more than one equilibria. At worst, there would be no way of telling
what interpretation would be efficient since the interpretation that seems
most efficient in the particular practice setting may only be so because of
other linked stabilizing interpretations which, if rendered differently
would have resulted in a wildly different assessment of efficiency.'89 In
both courses of action, the particular choice would mean that the business of choosing one over the other is political-an act of expressing
preference of a certain group that would benefit from the interpretation
over another group.
Second, it presumes that the traditional mode or culture independent
of formal law is incapable of producing a functional level of stability and
security sufficient to inspire economic confidence in the economic actors. In terms of jurisprudential analysis, the dichotomy between the
traditional customary norms of property ownership and the formal norms
of private property has been shown to be tenuous.' 9° At the same time,
empirical studies have shown that the assumption that customary tenure
system leads to less economic returns is, at best, unsupported by extant
evidence.' 9' Further empirical impugning of this position has been supplied by the experiences of the experiences of modern capitalist
economies in East Asia. Here, it has been demonstrated that tradition, in
the form of personal and professional networks can, and does actually
sustain the economic norms of property and contract rights. This con189.
Kennedy, supra note 14, at 472.
190.
There are a number of ongoing projects aimed at dispelling the Western-Nonwestern bifurcation of conceptions of property ownership along an arbitrary individualcommunal line or efficient-inefficient system. See, e.g., Kang'ara, supra note 33; Nyamu,
supra note 56.
191.
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tributes to economic prosperity while marginalizing and retaining primacy over the use of formal legal institutions.' 9
Lastly, the aspect of differentiation of the political from the economic is meant to remove certain modes of reasoning which are in
themselves policy choices, from debate by fencing them off as legal
questions deducible by logical procedures. However, the logic turns out
to be contingent on the very first choices made. This becomes ideological in the sense that the analysis is suspended at this juncture, hence
constructing the policy choice as inevitable or immutable.
C. The Indeterminacy of Land Registration
It may thus be said that during the existence of this parallel system it
was possible to say that there was security of tenure because there were
constant negotiations and renegotiations of the social forces at play. At
the informal level, one always knew the status of the land one was dealing with. Consequently, one knew the institutions that would come to
play should one take particular actions on or regarding the land. We
might say that at this time security of tenure referred mainly to public
means of enforcement with less emphasis on individual ownership and
land use. My argument is that the parallel system ensured secure property rights in the sense envisioned by the World Bank between 1956 and
early 1980s. At this time, the World Bank privileged individual ownership of titled land as a means of safeguarding against governmental
encroachment or confiscation. To the extent that this parallel system removed the concern over forcible confiscation by the government then it
would seem to have adequately ensured "security of tenure."
However, this parallel system, though spawned by a registration system that would be supported by most neo-classical commentators, would
be considered unsatisfactory even by neo-classical economists despite its
stability and despite the fact that it ensured security of tenure. First, the
situation meant that the national political and economic elite was able to
legally fence off and protect massive tracks of land and just hoard them
for speculative purposes. This would be wrong from both sides of the
debate. For socialists and dependency commentators, this granting of
individual, indefeasible titles thwarted attempts to achieve a more equitable distribution of land. 93 This frustrates neo-classical theory that land
registration creates a land market that ensures an efficient use of the resource since the national political and economic elite basically got large
tracts of land for speculation purposes. Yet, speculation causes a speculative bubble-the price of land as an asset displays an explosive
192.
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divergence from its fundamental value. 94 The speculation problem in
land markets can be quite severe.'95 By 1966, the Kenyan government
had already perceived it to be a big problem:
There is also urgent need for a land tenure policy to ensure that
projected agricultural development is not concentrated in the
hands of the few. Having regard to some of the problems of transition, a working party might be established to consider the need
and practicability of establishing ceilings on individual ownerand to advise on the machinery for making
ship of property,
96
effective.
these
The parallel system frustrates neo-classical theorists for another reason: it enables the peasants to continue to remain uncaptured-one of
the major, if unstated objectives of the land registration system. In other
words, the development path enabled by this perception of "security of
tenure" ensured a particular development path in Kenya. The development spawned by this perception, on the other hand, favored and was
reinforced by the alliance between a thriving peasantry and international
capital.
Apart from the above unanticipated effects of land registration,
which can be added to the fact that the implementation of the registration
process per se was marked by manipulability of essentially indeterminate concepts, there are several other consequences that challenged the
orthodox thinking about the effect of legal institutions on an economy.
There is a tendency in the literature to regard law and legal institutions
A price bubble is a situation in which "the arbitrary, self-fulfilling expectation of
194.
price changes may drive actual price changes independently of marketfundamentals." ROBERT
P. FLOOD & PETER M. GARBER, SPECULATIVE BUBBLES, SPECULATIVE ATTACKS, AND POLICY
SWITCHING 3 (1994). If bubbles exist in asset markets, market prices will differ from their

fundamental values. On how exactly speculative bubbles occur, see CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 13 (1996).
See Walden Bello, Globalization in Crisis: The End of a "Miracle", MULTINAFeb. 1998, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/econ/globcris.htm
(demonstrating the severity of land speculation problems in Thailand).
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38 (1965). The Kenyan government's attitude towards development in the mid-1960s
was a strategy for dealing with three thorny issues: (I) the justification of the Kenyan government's controversial decision to deny working permits to hundreds of British Indians who had
settled in Kenya but who had been denied British passports to travel back; (2) justification of
the selective program of Africanization taking place, especially in the Civil Service; (3) the
alienation of the increasingly popular radical Marxist voice within Kenyan politics. This government publication seems anxious to demonstrate that the problems of which Marx wrote
little affected Africans, stating, "Marx' criticism of the society of his time and place was a
valid one ... [But] it bears little similarity to Kenya today ... African traditions have no parallel to the European feudal society, its class distinctions, its unrestricted property rights, and
its acceptance of exploitation. The historical setting that inspired Marx has no counterpart in
independent Kenya." Id. at 6-7.
KENYA
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as technical tools that, once adopted, will produce the desired outcome.'97
The Kenya land registration process challenges this thinking as it failed
to usher in the expected economic outcome.
What is more is the fact that the registration process appears to have
generated results that challenge the orthodox thinking about the evolution of a rational legal system as a significant factor in facilitating the
development of capitalism.'98 I am referring here to Weber's argument
that the formal, rational procedural law is the prelude to capitalistic development because this genre of laws is calculable and predictable in
both adjudication and public administration.'" However, in Kenya, despite this provision of legal form, it did not result in particular economic
development. Indeed, the opposite seems to have happened. There was,
instead, a re-invention of customary law as a strategic maneuver to
thwart the full application of the "formal, procedural rationality" laws.
The outcome of the registration attempts has led to a very interesting
evolution of the concept of "security of tenure" as it is used by many
multilateral agencies. Though proved to be misconstrued on the ground,
the "security of tenure" argument still survived and acquired both intellectual and legal integrity through ideological peddling. As Robert Bates,
David Laitin and Anthony Marx have shown regarding race consciousness and hegemonies, the "security of tenure" argument, through
repeated usage, was packaged in a necessitation logic that increasingly
reified the concept.2°° The important thing about the reification process is
that the reified concept is not necessarily as functional as it may seem in
retrospect. Rather it is in its stability and not coherence that the concept
becomes powerful and ideological. In its reified mode, a concept can be
expanded or constricted to comprehend various competing usages that fit
the wider political project being pursued. This is true of the securitization of tenure in Kenya.
D. The Registrationof Land, Liberalism and the Rights Discourse
The introduction of land registration can also be understood as the
process of introducing different actors to the concept of registered land
as a legal category to which forward-looking rights could be applied.
The purpose of the process and the discourse of land registration was to
197.
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sensitize different actors of potential for the rights discourse to mediate
the fundamental contradiction that was necessarily being introduced into
the society.20'
The act of introducing the category of "registered lands" to which
certain forward-looking rights applied was intended to convince both
strong and weak actors that the third actor, first the latter-day Colonial
state and later, the new independent state, would protect both by use of
its collective powers. However, the discourse of rights depends for its
success on the faith of all the actors. The problem here was that the indigenous or ethnic actors who saw themselves as relatively weak did not
have such a faith in the rights discourse.
These "weak" actors viewed the registered land category as only giving them rights against the state that they had traditionally associated
with predation. However, they did not see the newly introduced rights as
mediating their individual interactions. In other words, they failed to see
or accept the very raison d'etre for registration and the introduction of
the rights: the hope that the "weak" party will find a sufficient reason to
fuse with the "strong" party without fear of domination. °2
Instead, the "weak" actors were willing to use rights discourse in
property relations to erect legitimate controls on the power of the state,
but not to structure their individual relationships. For relationships between weak and strong actors, they turned instead to traditional
20
customary norms.03
In other words, the actors failed to accept an important aspect of modernization that was being introduced. While they were
willing to accept the possibility of rights to fence off the state, they were
uninterested in using them to structure their social or economic individual relationships.
The problem of non-acceptance of the repercussions of registered
lands as granting individuals specific rights to structure both individual
and state relationships, made it difficult to employ efficiency arguments
in favor of land registration. 2" The liberal structure upon which capitalist
development was envisaged for Kenya depended upon the acceptance by
all of the belief and faith in the rights discourse and its various associated beliefs. Differently stated, there was critical need for the actors to
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In this context, I emphasize traditionsand traditionalbecause most of these norms
turned out to be not very traditionalbut heavily revised (even invented) by the changing situation. This is not unique to this situation. As Nicholas Dirks, explains, this is because through
their daily social practices people in society are "constantly negotiating questions of power,
authority and the control of the definitions of reality." Dirks, supra note 150.
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See discussion infra Section X.E.
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be persuaded that it was possible to overcome the liberal contradiction in
practice as well as in theory.0 5
To return to Kennedy's characterization, in liberal thinking, a weak
person aims to induce the State to use its power to control the strong
without putting the state in the structural position of the strong person.2 The answer supplied in liberal thinking is the concept of rights: a person
who believes in rights is in a position to deny that his feelings toward
others are contradictory. He can believe that he wants, to fuse with them,
so long as they respect his rights. He can believe that he is fused with the
state so long as it protects rights, and opposed to it when it does less or
207
more.
However, the Kenyan situation presented a deeper problem. People
were willing to accept the second part of the equation without the first
one. They were willing to "fuse" with the state to the extent that it would
restrict itself from preying on them. The rights were to be used to tie the
state's own hands so that it was unable to confiscate or interfere with
their property arrangements. Hence, these people were using land registration as a means of setting up the government to solve the "Weingast
paradox., 20 ' A government that is strong enough to create and protect
property rights is also strong enough to confiscate and expropriate them.
Therefore, for such a government to create reasonable expectations in
investors that it will not confiscate or alter property rights, it must give
credible signals of its commitment to respect tenure arrangementsY29
Hence, the "weak" actors thought of registration more as a way of tying
the government's hands and eliciting credible statements of its commitment to respecting private property. An alternative way to look at this
suggestion is to use the political science concept of time-inconsistency.
205.
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hension for economic actors because it may empower state officials to act in ways that
undermine economic investors' expectations to reap the fruits of their investments. The only
way to solve the paradox is to have both a strong state as well as state political institutions
structured in a way that gives confidence to economic actors that the government will not use
its power to undermine private investment. See generally Douglass C. North & Barry Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice
in Seventeenth Century England, 49 J. ECON. HISTORY 803 (1989). North and Weingast argue
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the security to invest in their property.
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Time-inconsistent policies are those in which policy-makers have an incentive to deviate from pre-announced policies after the economic actors
have already acted on their strength. ° Since economic actors will base
their decisions on the expectation that the policy-makers will deviate
after announcing the policies or rules, the result is sub-optimal economic
activity. In this scenario, one way for the policy-makers to make their
commitments in rules or policies credible is to bind themselves by a set
of rules that limit their exercise of discretionary power to alter the preannounced rules or policies.2"'
In the case of Kenya, however, people accepted only the first part of
the equation, namely that the State needed to make credible commitments that it would not reverse policies and rules related to land
ownership. At the same time, however, people did not intend or envisage
fusion with the state to extent of their individual property relations. As
far as fusion with others was concerned, they preferred to structure their
personal relationships, including property relations, on customary norms,
not the liberal concept of right. In other words, they fragmented the operation of the rights discourse: as far as their relationship with the State
was concerned, they were willing to accept the liberal concept of rights
to structure and direct this relationship. However, as far as their own relations with others, they preferred and continued to resort to their own
customary norms.
This paradoxical situation has been enabled and supported by what
Claude Ake calls "salient duality."2 2 As explained above, in Kenya, like
in most of the rest of Africa, there is a partial displacement of the state
by informal communities and ethnic groups. 213 The most important reasons for this are the legacy of the colonial state, the manner in which
independence was granted, and how different communities strategically
transformed themselves and their institutions to the new circumstances.
However, the continued entrenchment of the ethnic groups can be explained by the deep suspicion and skepticism that many continue to feel
toward the State:
[The state] has only succeeded in creating [an entity] that is
mainly a coercive force unable to transform power into authority; and domination into hegemony ...The colonial state was
inherited rather than transformed. Like the colonizers before
210.
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them, most of the nationalist leaders regarded the state as the instrument of their will. They privatized, and exploited it for
economic gain and used it oppressively to absolutize their
power. [The state] is largely regarded as a hostile force to be
evaded,214cheated, defeated and appropriatedas circumstances
permit.

As far as property relations and registration of land in particular was
concerned, formal registration was seen as one way to appropriate the
state's power and restrict its predation. On the other hand, the alternative
social formations have been transformed into social polities that members of the community turn to structure their individual relationships.
This development-the retail or "unwholesale" acceptance of the
liberal idea of rights to govern property relations-was unanticipated by
those who called for registration on efficiency grounds. In my view, it is
in part to tackle this issue that the registration exercise has been suffused
with individual aspects of the tenure system that was being introduced. It
was hoped that by emphasizing the individual aspects of land ownership,
the society would be pushed more toward believing that they needed the
liberal discourse on rights to structure individual dealings. The shift in
World Bank thinking about the meaning and need for "security of tenure" reflects this realization. The emphasis in the clarification of the
individual owner and emphasis in the private law regimes comes as part
of this realization. We therefore see all these, in this context, as efforts to
of the rights discourse to solve the
persuade individuals of the possibility
21 5
contradiction."
"fundamental
E. The Evolution and Shift in the Meaning of "Security of Tenure"
In the recent studies by the World Bank, it is becoming increasingly
clear that what is meant by "security of tenure" is no longer freedom
from fear of encroachment or confiscation by the government or as indicator of how well a government has managed to resolve the Weingast
paradox.2 6 The government could be understood to have resolved the
paradox by permitting the parallel system to exist. Allowance of the traditional institutions to continue to operate informally in the rural areas
coupled with a promise and willingness to vigorously enforce individual
ownership in urban and large-scale farms, created a confidence that the
government would not interfere with ownership of property. Instead, the
World Bank increasingly privileges a definition of "security of tenure"
214.
215.
216.
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that emphasizes two aspects of private ownership of property: 1) utmost
clarity in the identification of the private owner; and 2) the granting of
extensive power to the private owner to develop, change, and alienate the
land as he pleases without restriction.
This changed perception of the definition of "security of tenure"
emphasizes the increasing use of private law regimes. In a sense, the
World Bank has shifted its emphasis and hence the meaning and reasons
for supporting formal registration of titles. Additionally, this change in
meaning tracks and corresponds to a similar change in World Bank
thinking about development generally and about reigning attitudes concerning the role of government in economic development. 7 What is
more is the fact that this change also points to a similar change in the
channeling of government resources as advocated by the World Bank
and other multilateral development agencies." 8
This shift in meaning and emphasis commits the government to
channel more resources toward institutions that would serve these two
functions. A good illustration of this trend is the agitation for the reform
of the judicial system-reasons for which are typically hinged, not
merely on the quick delivery of justice, but on commercial need of an
efficient judiciary. While neo-liberalism rebukes government intervention in the market and calls for a diminution of the government, in truth,
what is happening is the re-channeling of government resources from the
more "public" aspects of intervention to the more "private" forms of intervention. By withdrawing resources from the provision of subsidies for
primary healthcare or elementary education, for example, to extensive
217.
This shift in thinking was initially sparked in the 1990s by concerns over the relative ineffectiveness of international development aid and the pervasive effects of endemic
corruption in many developing countries. These concerns prompted international financial
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revisit their traditional approaches to development. The outcome of these inquiries was a new
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in 1989 its reference to the development crisis in Africa as a "crisis of governance" calling for
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Ahrens, Governance, Conditionalityand Transformation in Post-SocialistCountries, in GOOD
GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

54 (Herman Hoen ed., 2001) ; Gathii, Re-

telling Good Governance Narratives, supra note 27; Gathii, The Limits, supra note 27;
RITTICH, supra note 27.
218.
Since the World Bank's 1989 annual report describing the development problem in
most of Africa as a "crisis in governance:' development donors have insisted that governments
in developing countries must shed the fundamental economic roles they had arrogated to
themselves. Transformation of the economic role of government, the so-called "governance
conditionality" was explicitly made conditional to the receipt of further development aid. See
Governance-related Conditionalities of the International FinancialInstitutions, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), G-24 Discussion Paper Series No.
6, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/MDPB/G24/6 (2000).

Winter 20041

Re-Examining the Role of PrivateProperty

and expensive projects to ensure a streamlined formal system of land
holding, the government shifts its use of resources from a "public" project (which is supposedly bad) to a "private" project (which would
supposedly breed more productivity and efficiency). Such a shift of resources also involves massive political choices that are never made
explicit in the many technical, supposedly politically neutral policy prescriptions. By channeling resources to the more "private" projects, the
government also shifts massive resources from certain classes of people
(mainly the rural poor) to another class of persons (mainly the rising
petty bourgeois). This decision is inherently political, but deemed merely
technical and politically neutral by the mere posturing of the economic
reform project.
In this sense, the World Bank entrenches certain ideological positions while posturing as mere technocrats. By fragmenting the land
registration issue from its political and institutional foundations, the
World Bank manages to render a thoroughly political choice into a scientific technical decision-in essence making political decisions without
the attendant political debate. The implicit distinction between public
and private is achieved by arbitrarily positing the axis and fashioning
justifications of intervention and non-intervention depending on what
side of the axis the intervention falls. All interventions beyond the arbitrary, bright line are termed as wasteful public intervention. Interventions
on the other side of the line, though they be of similar quality, are
deemed
to create conditions for private investors and are hence permissi21 9
ble.
A third related factor is the fact that this shift in meaning actually
encourages and enables a shift in the alliances of classes that have
formed in Kenya, which in turn produces a different development pattern.220 In the earlier system that produced the bifurcation explained
above, a thriving peasantry formed an alliance or at least mutually reinforced international capital. What is interesting is that the rhetoric of
security of tenure in this second form has been captured and appropriated by the local bourgeoisie who now use the courts to clarify
ownership and disposal mechanisms. For example, there has been a
sharp increase of cases in which a certificate of title has been proved to
219.
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be conclusive of ownership of the parcel of land despite competing
claims by third parties.22 '
CONCLUSION

The foregoing account of land registration in Kenya indicates that
processes we might imagine to be "merely technical" may, in fact, be
highly complex and complicated. Rather than translate into economic
consequences in a unilinear fashion, they usher in unanticipated economic and political responses, as well as enable strategic normative and
instrumental deployment of formal categories. This account shows that
the economic strategy reflected in the specific legal arrangement, namely
formalization of individual title, espoused particular political goals.
However, not only did the economic effects extrapolated not follow, but
further, the legal arrangements elected to convey the economic outcome
proved capable of delivering unanticipated political and legal outcomes.
To rationalize the legal arrangement and the extrapolated economic
and political effects means containing or managing the meanings of the
categories created by the legal scheme, in order to channel the effects
and avoid slippage. In other words, it means assigning meanings and
relationships-denying some, strengthening some, weakening some.
This complex creation and negation of subjects and meanings reflect
desired political and economic objectives and the role ideology plays in
legitimating legal and political arrangements. It also demonstrates that
the government must play an integral role in denying specific meanings,
granting others as it allocates rights to one group at the expense of the
others.
The story of land registration in Kenya shows how power relationships born of articulated meanings are created by legal discourse and
how that discourse can systematically empower and dis-empower. It also
shows the fictitious nature of legal institutions. Most importantly, this
account demonstrates the dangerously loose space opened up by enactment of formal legal categories that a transforming government can use
to shape politics and interpretations of private law in a way that may
perversely distort the market. By focusing on the nested, sequential
nexus between formal, sound institutions such as "clear property rights",
the neo-liberal discourse tends to ignore this space. The results are twofold. Either, the economic and political elite appropriates this space to
shape the ensuing market to the detriment of the general social welfare
or the meanings and interpretations are so varied that the extrapolated
221.
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advantage of formalizing the institutions does not follow. Both fall short
of the neo-liberal desideratum of "clear property rights" and resultant
investor confidence.
The account of land registration in Kenya challenges the neo-liberal
development in another fundamental way. Rational choice theory assumes the rational, utility-maximizing actor selects the alternative that
maximizes utility and/or contribution to goals and preferences, but
within institutional constraints. 2222 One such institutional constraint is the
feasible endowment set. For the actor to rank her preferences over possible outcomes to make the choice that yields the most preferred outcome
the endowment set must be fixed. This is the power of formal, clear legal
rules on property and freedom of contract in neo-liberal theorizing. It is
assumed, for example, that land registration would ensure clear property
rights that can define the feasible set in a definite way. However, from
the account of land registration in Kenya, it turns out that even formalization of title does not, absent ideological ordering of legal categories,
solve the problem of the fixed endowment set. Rather than being fixed,
the endowment set tends to be in flux. This is because the value, exclusivity and transferability of property depends, not just on two specific
actors contracting but also on third parties such as their families, clans,
courts, and society at large. It depends on how all others play their various chips for the ultimate value, or ownership of property rights to be
assessed. This social aspect of property rights must be reflected in the
definitions of property rights that legal and economic scholars formulate.
They must also be taken account of in formulating legal reform.
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